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Abstract

The forces driving the prescription opioid epidemic currently raging across the
United States include aggressive marketing, weak regulation, addiction, freely
prescribing doctors, a glut of pills available for sharing, and easy access to illicit drugs
like heroin. This thesis aims to quantitatively analyze the interactions between these
drivers through construction of a System Dynamics model, in order to determine the
efficacy of policy intervention through Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs. The
System Dynamics model simulates the flow of doctors’ prescriptions to the two very
different classes of prescription opioid patients. One class is the long-term pain patients
whose tolerance and appetite for opioids grows over time, leading them to higher doses,
often dangerously high, and yet also frequently to feeling under-medicated; the other is
those patients prescribed opioids for short-term pain, who typically find that they have
been given more pills than they need.
These “extra” pills find their way into the hands of friends and family who, in
common with the patients who received prescriptions, are in jeopardy of addiction to the
opioids. Those addicted repeatedly visit doctors, shopping for more. Sensitivity analysis
results reveal that drug diversion is a major contributor to the opioid death rate; that
mandatory PDMP use will slow but not stop opioid proliferation, and will cause long
term pain patients to be under-treated in larger numbers; that a significant number of
people addicted to prescription opioids will transition to heroin use for reasons of price
and availability; and that the rate of opioid overdose deaths will remain high until and
unless society is better educated about the risks of addiction. Overall, the study helps
conclude that the efforts of state governments and the FDA will be insufficient to stem
the flow of opioids, and that there is no simple intervention to thwart drug diversion and
sharing of pills.
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1. Introduction
An epidemic of prescription opioid abuse is raging across the United States. The
news reports daily about the tragic costs in human suffering and death. The purpose of
this paper is to investigate how this terrible situation arose, and to ask if the policies
being proposed and enacted have the potential to bring the problem under control. The
approach taken begins with a thorough review of the literature. From this review I will
synthesize the most salient issues into a simple model that attempts to capture the
dynamics of the epidemic. The reality of the problem is very complex, and so the model
will necessarily be naïve. Yet it is my hope that the model will lead to the identification
of some recommendations that may prove useful to understanding and remediating the
epidemic.

Since the year 2000 the rate of opioid prescription overdose deaths in the U.S.A.
has doubled. More than a hundred thousand people have died. Opioid deaths are the
second leading cause of accidental death. They are more numerous than deaths from
falling, fires, choking, or accidental gunshot. Deaths from opioids are second only in
number to motor vehicle deaths. In 2014 the number of deaths from legal prescription
opioid overdose was 20,000. This is greater than the number of overdose deaths from the
illegal drugs cocaine and heroin combined. (https://www.drugabuse.gov/relatedtopics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates).
In order to combat the problem, the White House Office of Drug Control
Management https://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/national-drug-control-strategy
published and annually updates the prescription drug abuse action plan called “Epidemic:
Responding to America’s Prescription Drug Abuse Crisis” (2011). This plan calls for
action regarding opioids through education, monitoring, safe storage & disposal, and
enforcement. The second of these four strategies – monitoring – is the focus of this thesis.
Specifically, I focus on the use of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs).
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Responsibility for monitoring of prescription drugs lies at the level of the states.
PDMPs are state-run electronic databases used by prescribers, pharmacies and law
enforcement to track particular prescription medications. State policy makers have
embraced the use of PDMPs in the last decade. Forty-nine states (all except Missouri)
have operational PDMPs. The specifics of implementation vary widely from state to
state. In particular, the use of PDMPs is not mandatory in every state. Many users and
abusers of opioids have gathered lethal amounts of the drugs legally. They obtain their
drugs from prescribing doctors by the simple tactic of visiting several doctors. They
receive multiple prescriptions, and fill them at different pharmacies, to avoid attracting
unwanted attention. This practice is known as “doctor shopping’ (McDonald & Carlson
2014). The resultant glut of prescription opioids leads to widespread illicit use. The
excess drugs are spread through diversion to friends and family, and to drug sellers.
In this thesis I will assess the efficacy of PDMPs. I will study the role of PDMPs
in stopping opioid abuse through diversion and doctor shopping. I will compare and
contrast best practices between the states. I will place a particular emphasis on the impact
of New York State’s PDMP, which is called I-STOP. An important distinguishing feature
of I-STOP is that doctors and pharmacists dispensing opioids must use the system. Many
other states have not made their PDMPs mandatory. Utilization is found to be much
higher when participation is mandatory, as described in detail later.

Implementation of internet-based PDMPs is still in its infancy. Government
agencies have been quick to claim success for PDMPs. Yet their analyses are still very
preliminary, and generally rather superficial. For example, a recent review by Joshua
Vinciguerra, New York Director of the Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, reports that
since I-STOP’s inception (1) over 34 million PMP searches on more than 12 million
patients by over 96,000 searchers have been performed (2) that a comparison of opioid
prescribing during the year prior to mandated PMP use and the year post implementation
shows an 8.72% decrease in total prescriptions, (3) that the number of patients with a
prescription has decreased 10.4%, (4) that in the first year of the mandated use of the
PDMP the number of “doctor- shoppers” decreased by 75%, and (5) that that trend has
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continued with a further drop from the fourth quarter of 2012 to the third quarter of 2015
to 86%. (http://www.nascsa.org/Conference2015/Presentations/vinciguerra1.pdf)
Closer examination reveals that the definition of “doctor shopper” in this
presentation is “individuals receiving Rx from 5 or more prescribers & dispensed by 5 or
more pharmacies”. By this definition the number of doctor shoppers in New York State
is only a few hundred (Figure 1). Yet the number of prescribers in New York State
exceeds 100,000, and the number of prescriptions written in New York City alone
exceeds 2,000,000. Clearly, such a crude algorithm as the Bureau of Narcotic
Enforcement’s “five prescribers and five pharmacies” only identifies the most egregious
examples of doctor shopping. Yet this definition will arise repeatedly in other
publications cited later.

Figure 1 http://www.slideshare.net/OPUNITE/pdmp-5-hopkins-dreyzehneroleary

Despite early claims of success in fighting doctor shopping, opioid deaths and
illicit opioid use continue to rise. Two major challenges arise in studying this problem.
Firstly, PDMPs are new (and so there is not much data yet). Secondly, the system of
opioid migration and use within which PDMPs operate is not well understood.

Nevertheless there is strong evidence of time delays between cause and effect. For
example, (1) between first writing a patient’s prescription and subsequent opioid
dependency, and (2) between the increase in prescription rate and the increase in death
rate; and (3) through accumulations of “stocks & flows” of drugs and their subsequent
illicit uses. Time delays and stocks & flows are well modeled by System Dynamics (e.g.
-4-

Sterman 2000). In this thesis I therefore build and employ a system dynamics model of
opioid use. This approach will reveal the context in which PDMPs operate. It will also
model the impact of PDMPs on the use and abuse of opioids.
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2. Literature Review
This literature review is organized in five sections. (1) The History of Opioid Use,
(2) The Need for Government Intervention and Current Policy Proposals, (3) Prescription
Drug Monitoring Programs, (4) PDMP Performance Measures, and (5) Support for and
Continuous Improvement of PDMPs.
2.1 A History of Opioid Use: Opioids have been used as medicine for thousands of
years. A timeline of opioid use with many sources cited is give at:
http://www.theatlantic.com/sponsored/purdue-health/a-brief-history-of-opioids/184/
The Drug Enforcement Administration Museum recounts that
The Sumerians referred to opium as Hul Gil, the "joy
plant" [and] soon passed it on to the Assyrians, who in turn
passed it on to the Egyptians. As people learned of the
power of opium, demand for it increased. Many countries
began to grow and process opium to expand its availability
and to decrease its cost. Its cultivation spread along the
Silk Road, from the Mediterranean through Asia and finally
to China where it was the catalyst for the Opium Wars of
the mid-1800s. In order to fund their ever-increasing desire
for Chinese produced tea, Britain, through their control of
the East India Company, began smuggling Indian opium to
China. This resulted in a soaring addiction rate among the
Chinese and led to the Opium Wars of the mid-1800s.
Subsequent Chinese immigration to work on the railroads
and the gold rush brought opium smoking to America.
(https://www.deamuseum.org/ccp/opium/history.html)
Laudanum (tincture of opium in alcohol) was widely used by the Victorians. They
used it for recreation, for inspiration, for pain relief, and to quiet babies. Morphine was
derived from opium in the early 19th century. Like laudanum, morphine was named after
a joyful Latin word, this time the god of dreams. Used widely, it became especially
prevalent with soldiers during the civil war. After the war, addiction was so widespread
amongst veterans, that it became known as “soldiers disease”. The US found itself in the
midst of its first opioid epidemic. Around this time the hypodermic needle was
developed. The medical community embraced the widespread use of morphine.
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Because of the addiction concerns associated with morphine, a safer “nonaddictive” alternative was sought. This was the reason why Bayer developed heroin. In
fact heroin was first marketed as a cough suppressant and non-addictive morphine
alternative. The name itself is derivative of the word heroine, female hero, or savior.

According to Inciadi & Cicero (2009),

Thomas Dover, a student of British physician Thomas
Sydenham, is considered the “father” of clinical medicine,
and a strong advocate of the use of opium for the treatment
of disease. Dover developed a form of medicinal opium
known as Dover’s Powder, that contained one ounce each
of opium, ipecac (the dried roots of a tropical creeping
plant), and licorice, combined with saltpeter, tartar, and
wine. Dover’s Powder was introduced in 1709 and soon
made its way to America, where it remained one of the most
widely used opium preparations for almost two centuries
(Inciardi, 2008; Souhami, 2001; Terry & Pellens 1928 ).
The introduction of Dover’s Powder apparently started a
trend. By the latter part of the eighteenth century, similar
patent medicines containing opium were readily available
throughout urban and rural America. They were sold in
pharmacies, grocery and general stores, at traveling
medicine shows, and through the mail (Terry & Pellens,
1928). This patent medicine industry eventually provided
the backdrop for the abuse of prescription drugs and other
pharmaceuticals (Inciardi, 2008).
This was the age of patent medicines -- a medicine sold without a prescription in
drugstores or by sales representatives, and usually protected by a trademark. At that time
you could throw what ever you wanted into a bottle -- usually with alcohol, cocaine,
opioids, and some other euphoric drugs -- and claim it was medicine. Addiction was not
understood well at all during this time. Some doctors even substituted opioids for alcohol,
claiming it was a way to treat alcoholism.

The first federal drug law was the opium exclusion act in 1909. This law
specifically targeted opium smokers, typically Chinese immigrants. It made provision for
opium derivatives including morphine and laudanum still to be consumed. In December
-7-

1908 an international commission met in Shanghai to discuss ending the international
opium trade. This was the first step in creating the modern international drug prohibition
framework. As with many other instances of prohibition, when opium was outlawed,
criminals stepped in to meet the demand. Initially the supply dropped considerably,
driving the price up dramatically. Soon after, criminals were matching and even
exceeding the previous supply.

In 1914 Congress passed the Harrison Act, which levied taxes on the non-medical
use of opium, cocaine, marijuana and their derivatives. In 1924 the Heroin Act outlawed
all use, manufacturing and possession of heroin, even medically. A series of laws
followed in an attempt to gain control of the drug market, both for tax purposes and in
order to protect consumers and patients. Finally, in 1938, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act brought cosmetics and medical devices under control. This law required that drugs be
labeled with adequate directions for safe use. Moreover, it mandated pre-market approval
of all new drugs. Now a manufacturer would have to prove to the FDA that a drug was
safe before it could be sold.

A summary of one hundred years of drug control efforts was published by the UN
on the centennial of the 1909 opium convention in Shanghai.
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/100_Years_of_Drug_Control.pdf

The Durham-Humphrey amendment to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
became effective on April 26 1952 (JAMA. 1952;149(4):371), mandating that

Drugs that cannot be used with relative safety in self-medication
must bear the legend Caution: Federal law prohibits
dispensing without prescription on their labels. The
pharmacist is liable to prosecution if he makes an over-thecounter sale of any such drug to a customer without obtaining a
bona fide prescription or oral authorization from a licensed
practitioner.
The Durham-Humphrey amendment marked the beginning of written
prescriptions. Now prescriptions were slowly adopted across the states. During the 1970s
-8-

the federal scheduling system was implemented. From then on, the federal government
provided more direction on how prescription drugs should be distributed.

In 1970 President Nixon declared war on drugs. The Controlled Substances Act
established the current prescription scheduling system in place to this day in the US. This
was the beginning of the modern problems. Nixon’s Special Message to the Congress on
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control on June 17, 1971 included these words:
It is the production of morphine and codeine for medical
purposes which justifies the maintenance of opium
production, and it is this production which in turn
contributes to the world's heroin supply. The development
of effective substitutes for these derivatives would
eliminate any valid reason for opium production. While
modern medicine has developed effective and broadly
used substitutes for morphine, it has yet to provide a fully
acceptable substitute for codeine. Therefore, I am
directing that Federal research efforts in the United States
be intensified with the aim of developing at the earliest
possible date synthetic substitutes for all opium
derivatives. At the same time I am requesting the Director
General of the World Health Organization to appoint a
study panel of experts to make periodic technical
assessments of any synthetics which might replace opiates
with the aim of effecting substitutions as soon as possible.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3048

The repetitive nature of the drug problem over the last 150+ years is ominously
clear. In particular, the claims that Purdue Pharma made about Oxycontin in the 1990s
echo Nixon’s mandate from 1970. They are in turn the same claims used to market heroin
a century earlier. This repetition of historical patterns must be borne in mind when
considering modern changes such as the implementation of PDMPs. The repetitive nature
of the issues makes it easier for us to understand their nature, their likely pitfalls, and the
ways in which they will likely prove intractable.

2.2 The Need for Government Intervention and Current Policy Proposals: The
current prescription drug model, and the prohibition of Schedule 1 drugs, was born out of
a market failure. Before the implementation of any regulation during the last century
people were free to manufacture, trade, and consume any substances they wanted. As a
-9-

result many people died or became terribly addicted to substances whose dangers they
did not understand. Over time the current framework was established in order to address
this market failure and gain control of the situation. Despite all of the unintended
consequences associated with the modern drug control framework, we are better off
today than before drug control began (as demonstrated in the UN Report cited above).

On May 01, 2015 Nora D. Volkow, Director, National Institute on Drug Abuse
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations testified that
The misuse of opioids is … a public health epidemic with
devastating consequences including not just opioid use
disorders and related overdoses, but also the rising
incidence of newborns who experience neonatal abstinence
syndrome because their mothers used these substances
during pregnancy; and increased spread of infectious
diseases including HIV and hepatitis C (HCV).
Existing evidence based prevention and treatment
strategies are highly underutilized across the United States.
The recently announced initiative …emphasizes the
implementation of these evidence based prevention and
treatment strategies which include not only better
prescription practices but also deployment of medication to
combat overdoses and medication‑assisted treatment
(MAT) to treat opioid use disorders. … [This] initiative and
will focus on supporting research and disseminating
findings to improve opioid prescribing practices, to expand
the use of the opioid overdose reversal drug naloxone, to
improve the integration of pharmacotherapies into
treatment services in specialty care and primary care, and
to develop pain treatments with reduced potential for
misuse and diversion.
https://www.drugabuse.gov/about-nida/legislative-activities/testimony-tocongress/2016/what-federal-government-doing-to-combat-opioid-abuse-epidemic

Given that the government has to be involved in regulating drugs, it is imperative
that they do so effectively. Being better off than the Wild West drug market of the late
18th century is hardly a success. Even though we are clearly better off today than before
any drug control was in place, the staggering death rate from prescription drugs shows
- 10 -

that today’s form of drug control is inadequate and must be improved. The government is
obligated to enact effective policy. The fact that more people in the US die from medicine
prescribed by a doctor than from illicit cocaine and heroin combined is frequently framed
as a success for illicit drug control. In fact it is a clear sign that the medical community
and prescription drug system urgently needs to be reformed. The current drug policy
from the White House emphasizes specifically that the preferred intervention for
prescription drug abuse should be to improve information sharing, in other words to
establish PDMPs.
Very recent policy proposals reflect a growing awareness of the need for
government intervention. In Oct 2015 Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker proposed a
bill that would limit practitioners to prescribing no more than a 72-hour supply of opioids
to patients the first time they prescribe an opioid to them. In Feb 2016 The White House
proposed $1 billion in new funding over two years to fight heroin and prescription drug
abuse. Almost all of the new money, $920 million, would be for mandatory funding over
two years for states to increase medication-assisted treatment, which also involves
therapy, for people with opioid use disorders.
(http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/267895-white-house-proposes-1-billion-to-fight-opioid-epidemic)

Also in Feb 2016 the National Governors Association, frustrated by a perceived
lack of effective action, resolved to propose treatment protocols to reduce the use of
opioid painkillers. (http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/22/us/politics/governors-devise-bipartisan-effortto-reduce-opioid-abuse.html?_r=0)

In March 2016 the CDC issued comprehensive new

guidelines for the prescription of opioids for chronic pain (Dowell, Haegerich, and Chou,
2016). These guidelines addressed many of the issues raised in this thesis, specifically (1)
when to initiate or continue opioids for chronic pain, (2) opioid selection, dosage,
duration, follow-up, and discontinuation, and (3) the risks and harms of opioid use.
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/rr/rr6501e1.htm

2.3 Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs: The rationale for New York Attorney
General Eric T. Schneiderman’s 2012 proposal to address the prescription drug crisis was
that a modernization of the state’s Prescription Monitoring Program
- 11 -

would exponentially enhance the effectiveness of New
York’s existing PMP to increase detection of prescription
fraud and drug diversion [and] establish an on-line, realtime, controlled substance reporting system that requires
prescribers and pharmacists to search for and report
certain data at the time a controlled substance prescription
is issued, and at the time such substance is dispensed.
https://www.ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/press-releases/2012/ISTOP%20REPORT%20FINAL%201.10.12.pdf

The legislation, which passed both Assembly and Senate unanimously in June
2012:


requires the Department of Health to establish and maintain an on-line, real-time
controlled substance reporting system to track the prescription and dispensing of
controlled substances;



requires practitioners to review a patient's controlled substance prescription
history on the system prior to prescribing;



requires practitioners or their agents to report a prescription for such controlled
substances to the system at the time of issuance;



requires pharmacists to review the system to confirm the person presenting such a
prescription possesses a legitimate prescription prior to dispensing such
substance;



requires pharmacists or their agents to report dispensation of such prescriptions at
the time the drug is dispensed.
With the introduction of I-STOP, New York State has mandated the involvement

of prescription writers in PDMPs along with the pharmacies that fill those prescriptions.
Now, with very few exceptions, whenever a medical professional writes a prescription in
New York State they must first check I-STOP to look for suspicious behavior. This new
regulation is intended to fight doctor shopping, where a patient seeks drugs from many
different doctors in a short span of time either to source serious personal abuse or to sell
the drugs. With the extra involvement of doctors this behavior should be discovered.
However it will require extra time from the doctors, and the extra scrutiny and effort may
- 12 -

result in doctors writing fewer legitimate prescriptions. In turn people with legitimate
medical needs may not receive medicine. In this thesis I will evaluate I-STOP’s
effectiveness. A particular focus will be the mandated involvement of prescription
writers. The newness of I-STOP limits the amount of data available. The opportunities
inherent in cross-state comparisons led me to the methodology used in this paper.

The Federal Government funds substance abuse surveys (e.g., the National
Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH)
https://nsduhweb.rti.org/respweb/project_description.html). Criminal justice departments,

hospitals and health departments at the state and federal level also collect data. The rising
abuse of prescription drugs has been identified in all of these different sources. These
sources of data can also serve to help evaluate the effects of PDMPs. By looking at the
admission to emergency rooms for overdoses, drug arrests, and drug related deaths, in
different states, before and after the implementation of different forms of PDMPs, we can
hope to get a look at how effective the different policies are. The PDMPs themselves will
also serve as sources of data.
For example, the BJA Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Performance
Measures Report states that:

The performance measures ask for the number of patients
who have obtained prescriptions from five or more
prescribers and filled them at five or more pharmacies in
each reporting period (initially, six months; after July 1,
2010, three months). The measures also ask for the number
of non-liquid doses associated with these patients, broken
out by drug class—pain relievers, sedatives, stimulants,
and tranquilizers. We report these threshold measures as
ratios—of the number of patients meeting the five
prescriber/five pharmacy threshold to the total number of
patients who received a prescription during the reporting
period, and of the number of non-liquid doses associated
with the threshold-meeting patients to the total number of
non-liquid doses dispensed in the reporting period, overall
and by drug class. A parallel set of performance measures,
and ratios, is based on a 10 prescriber and 10 pharmacy
threshold. Each of these measures is asked for Schedule II
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prescriptions only, Schedule II and III prescriptions only,
and Schedule II, III, and IV prescriptions. These threshold
measures are thought to be indicators of questionable
activity.
Terminology and Methodology. In my literature search I made a complete
searches for the terms “doctor shopping”, “bad doctors”, “stolen scripts”, “opioid
prescription surveys”, “prescription opioid deaths”, “opioid epidemic”, “pill mills” and
“prescription mills”.
Footnote: The latter two terms, “pill mills” and “prescription mills” are used to
describe doctors’ offices that specialize in freely providing opioid prescriptions with lax
or no checks in place. For example, Florida was plagued by such operations until
recently. Specifically, 49 of the 50 largest prescribers in the USA were located within two
Florida counties. In 2010 and 2011 Florida took important legislative and enforcement
steps to bring the problem under a degree of control. $3M was allocated for enforcement
in Florida House Bill 7095 which

provides mandatory administrative penalties for certain
violations related to prescribing; requires prescriptions for
controlled substances to be written on counterfeit-resistant
pad produced by approved vendor or electronically
prescribed; provides conditions for being approved vendor;
requires certain physicians to designate themselves as
controlled substance prescribing practitioners on their
practitioner profiles.
The enforcement effort was sweeping. As reported in the press,

Agents went undercover and posed as patients. They tapped
phones to record calls and text messages. They seized
security video from cameras installed by the owners of the
clinics, recorded their own undercover videos and used the
IRS to follow the money. They eventually raided the South
Florida clinics, known as ‘pill mills,’ and amassed more
than 1.2 million pages of records and statements…
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/06/south-florida-pill-mill_n_3553196.html

--- end of footnote
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The papers identified in these literature searches show there is a strong consensus
that
access to healthcare generally, and to dentists and
pharmacists in particular, increases the availability of
prescription opioids in communities, which, in turn, is
associated with higher rates of opioid abuse” (Wright et al
2014).

That is, that the opioid epidemic is (at least in part) a self-inflicted problem within
the health care system.

Efforts to implement PDMPs are under way across the nation. There are many
papers that discuss the evaluation of their effectiveness, but the quality of such studies
has so far been poor. In a comprehensive literature review, Haegerlich et al (2014)
searched for evaluations of state policy or systems-level interventions that used “noncomparative, cross-sectional, before–after, time series, cohort, or comparison group
designs or randomized/non-randomized trials”. They confirmed that overall study quality
is low, and identified limitations including

lack of baseline data and comparison groups, inadequate
statistical testing, small sample sizes, self-reported
outcomes, and short-term follow-up.

Often the scope of these evaluative studies lies within a single state. In this thesis
I take the view that inter-comparison of data from different states provides an important
opportunity to identify policies and practices that will improve prescribing practices and
opioid use protocols, both of which are crucial to the protection of patient health.

Responsibility for monitoring and controlling prescription drugs lies at the level
of the state. There are large differences both in the time and in the specifics of
implementation from state to state. This means that in practice fifty different experiments
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are being conducted on how to build a PDMP. Table 1 shows examples of variations in
PDMP implementation by state (from http://www.pdmpassist.org).

Table 1: Examples of Variations in Implementation of PDMPs by State
Empty fields mean the program may be recently established and/or may not yet be collecting data.

#Prescribers

#Pharmacies

#Prescriptions

15,178

1,437

13,703,512

Alaska

4,364

107

585,290

Arizona

28,970

1,162

Alabama

Frequency

Agency Type

Start

Daily

Department of Health

2006

Monthly

Pharmacy Board

2011

Daily

Pharmacy Board

2008

Weekly

Department of Health

2013

Weekly

Law Enforcement Agency

1939

Arkansas

10,059

775

California

166,333

6,337

Colorado

25,787

820

Daily

Pharmacy Board

2007

Connecticut

21,476

689

Daily

Consumer Protection Agency

2008

Daily

Professional Licensing Agency

2012

Weekly

Department of Health

2011

Weekly

Law Enforcement Agency

2013

Bi-Weekly

Department of Health

2013

Weekly

Law Enforcement Agency

1943

Weekly

Pharmacy Board

1967

Delaware

45,136,908

4,733

223

Florida

67,588

4,882

Georgia

34,973

2,429

253

24

Hawaii

6,343

245

Idaho

7,204

313

2,599,175

Illinois

54,404

2,414

17,578,503

Daily

Department of Health

1968

Indiana

25,991

1,275

12,922,497

Weekly

Professional Licensing Agency

1998

Iowa

13,989

778

4,499,508

Weekly

Pharmacy Board

2009

13,894

673

Daily

Pharmacy Board

2011

Kentucky

17,425

1,162

Daily

Other

1999

Louisiana

17,168

1,230

12,723,870

Daily

Pharmacy Board

2008

2,532,441

Guam

Ka Kansas

Maine

24,842,120

7,484

313

Daily

Substance Abuse Agency

2004

Maryland

30,906

1,232

3 Days

Substance Abuse Agency

2013

Massachusetts

43,115

1,170

Daily

Department of Health

1994

Michigan

43,139

2,480

Daily

Professional Licensing Agency

1989

Minnesota

27,806

1,130

Daily

Pharmacy Board

2010

Mississippi

10,293

840

Daily

Pharmacy Board

2005

Missouri

22,430

1,318

Montana

5,102

269

Weekly

Pharmacy Board

2012

Nebraska

9,429

499

Daily

Other

2011

Nevada

9,846

475

Daily

Pharmacy Board

1997

New Hampshire

7,697

270

Weekly

Pharmacy Board

2014

44,064

2,048

Weekly

Law Enforcement Agency

2011

New Jersey
New Mexico
New York

6,700,000
6,000,000

3,932,259
4,000,606

9,627

329

Daily

Pharmacy Board

2005

108,256

5,019

Daily

Department of Health

1973
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Oregon

19,793

730

Pennsylvania

63,002

3,203

Rhode Island

5,881

208

South Carolina

18,589

1,154

Tennessee

30,064

1,676

Texas

91,727

5,223

Utah

12,082

540

Vermont

3,707

157

Virginia

38,227

1,635

Washington

37,145

1,280

West Virginia

8,052

584

Wisconsin

28,273

Wyoming

2,641

6,000,000

Weekly

Department of Health

2011

3 Days

Department of Health

1973

3 Days

Department of Health

1979

Daily

Department of Health

2008

Daily

Pharmacy Board

2006

41,440,478

Weekly

Law Enforcement Agency

1982

5,409,785

Daily

Professional Licensing Agency

1996

Weekly

Department of Health

2009

Weekly

Professional Licensing Agency

2003

Weekly

Department of Health

2011

Daily

Pharmacy Board

1995

1,152

Weekly

Pharmacy Board

2013

126

Weekly

Pharmacy Board

2004

3,614,306

Crucially, participation in PDMPs by prescribers and pharmacies is not
mandatory in every state. The impact of this very important factor will be considered in
detail later.

2.4 PDMP Performance Measures: In 2005, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA)
convened state representatives and BJA consultants to develop performance measures
for PDMPs. Over the following three years, an initial set of measures was adopted,
consistent with federal reporting requirements mandated by the Government
Performance Results Act (Bureau of Justice Assistance 2013). Measures were
developed in each of four areas: input, output, outcomes and impacts.

Inputs include training of prescribers, dispensers, and individuals authorized to
conduct investigations in how to access and use PDMP data.

Outputs are solicited reports in response to a request from a prescriber,
pharmacist, investigator, regulatory agency or other authorized end user of the PDMP,
while unsolicited reports result from the PDMP’s having identified questionable
prescription patterns.
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Outcomes focus is on consumers who fill prescriptions in a manner that may
indicate inappropriate use of prescription drugs. Measures in this area relate to the
number of individuals who exceed certain thresholds of prescribers and pharmacies, and
to the number of doses of drugs associated with these individuals.

The primary impact measure is the prevalence of inappropriate use of
prescription drugs by the general population, to be obtained from the National Survey
on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH). Secondary impact measures are overdoses and
deaths attributable to misuse of controlled substances. Reporting on these measures
has been required of BJA Harold Rogers PDMP grantees beginning in 2008 (see
chapter 6). The measures have been update and improved since that time, as described
in the next section.

The first comprehensive compilation of the measures, across the three and onehalf years from January 2009 through June 2012 showed:
• grantees provided formal trainings to several hundred prescribers and somewhat
fewer pharmacists over a typical 12-month period,
• registration rates increasing for four or more years after implementation of online
access, reaching an average of 58% in the first half of 2012 for the six states where
online access began prior to 2007,
• large increases in the number of solicited reports provided to in-state prescribers
(more than 400%), pharmacists (more than 200%), and law enforcement (more than
100%), and
• rates of individuals who had obtained Schedule II prescriptions from five or more
prescribers and five or more pharmacies in a three-month reporting period less than
1/10th of 1%.
http://www.pdmpexcellence.org/sites/all/pdfs/BJA_PDMP_Performance_Measures_1_09_6_12_fdbk.pdf

This report also contained the following extraordinary paragraph:
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We explored associations between non-medical use of
pain relievers and rates of drug-related overdose deaths
for the grantee states. We found that all years of nonmedical use were correlated with all years of overdose
death rates. However, the highest correlations were
between non-medical use in 2002/2003 and overdose
death rates in 2008, 2009, and 2010 (correlation
coefficients of .725, .747, and .754, respectively). (The
correlation between non-medical use in 2009/2010 and
overdose death rates in 2010 was .654.) This finding
suggests that the relationship between these two impact
measures may be complex…
This empirically determined time lag of several years in the correlation
between non-medical use of opioids and overdose deaths is one of the strong
motivations for the construction of my System Dynamics model below: specifically,
my model shows that the mean time from initial opioid addiction to death is several
years.

2.5 Support for and Continuous Improvement of PDMPs: The PDMP Training and
Technical Assistance Center (PDMP-TTAC) is a partnership between the Bureau of
Justice Assistance (BJA) and the Heller School for Social Policy & Management at
Brandeis University. The PDMP-TTAC provides assistance with developing policy and
information for PDMPs, collecting and reporting performance measurements, hosting
regional and national conferences, participating in interstate data sharing, and planning &
implementing new PDMPs.
http://pdmpassist.org/content/about-training-and-technical-assistance-center-ttac
Since 2010, the TTAC has conducted three State Surveys of PDMPs (2010, 2012,
2014). The surveys have gathered data on PDMP statutes, regulations, policies and
procedures, tracked their changes over time, and identified program trends and candidate
practices. In September 2012, the PDMP Center of Excellence (COE) published a white
paper entitled “Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs: An Assessment of the Evidence
for Best Practices”. Drawing on published research, consensus statements of expert
opinion, and accumulated experience among states, this report identified 35 best and
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promising practices likely to help maximize PDMP effectiveness. These fell into 7 major
categories:
Data collection and data quality
Data linking and analysis
User access and report dissemination
PDMP recruitment, utilization, and education
Inter-organizational best practices for PDMPs
Evaluation of PDMPs
Funding PDMPs

http://pdmpassist.org/pdf/state_survey_comparisons_TAG_FINAL_20151222.pdf

The best practices identified and recommended for implementation in all PDMPs were:
Collect positive identification for the person picking up prescriptions
Collect data on method of payment, including cash transactions
Reduce data collection interval; move toward real-time data collection
Integrate PDMP reports with health information exchanges, electronic health
records, and pharmacy dispensing systems
Send unsolicited reports and alerts to appropriate users
Mandate enrollment
Mandate utilization
Delegate Access
Enact and implement interstate data sharing among PDMPs
Secure funding independent of economic downturns, conflicts of interest, public
policy changes, and changes in PDMP policies
A federal program created by the FY 2002 U.S. Department of Justice Appropriations
Act (Public Law 107-77) and continued to date under each subsequent year’s
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Appropriations Act -- the Harold Rogers Prescription Drug Monitoring Program -supports competitive proposals “to enhance the capacity of regulatory and law
enforcement agencies and public health officials to collect and analyze controlled
substance prescription data and other scheduled chemical products through a centralized
database administered by an authorized state agency”.
https://www.bja.gov/Funding/13PDMPsol.pdf
Funding is a perennial problem for PDMPs, because there is no steady supply.
Some states prohibit using general state revenues for the programs. Private funding
supports some PDMPs, but many are supported only by federal grants. There have only
been two Federal PDMP grant-funding programs. The Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) administered The National All Schedules
Prescription Electronic Reporting (NASPER) grant. No funds have been appropriated for
the NASPER program since fiscal years 2009 and 2010, and NASPER grants are not
currently available. The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) Harold Rogers PDMP Grant
Program (HRPDMP) has made grants available to states since 2003 for the purpose of
planning, implementing and enhancing PDMPs. HRPDMP grant programs, however, are
a competition between states. They generally place a limit on the amount a state many
receive. They specify a funding period, and place restrictions on how the funds are to be
used. A state receiving an HRPDMP grant may not be eligible for future support.
A state’s legislature may allocate General Revenue funds for a PDMP. General
revenue funds come from state sales, income, and property taxes. The demands on state
revenues are many and the funds are limited. Passing legislation allocating sufficient
funds for PDMP operation requires persistent advocacy by those who might benefit from
effective prescription monitoring. Examples are medical groups and law enforcement.
The NYS AG testified in his case for I-STOP that 1/5th of the state budget in the years
leading up to I-STOP was spent on dealing with consequences of the opioid epidemic. He
suggested that savings from dealing with this epidemic effectively could offset some or
all of the costs incurred by I-STOP. This argument could also be advanced in every state.
http://www.pdmpassist.org/pdf/PDMP_Funding_Options_TAG.pdf
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In order to be effective PDMPs’ prescription data must be completely and
accurately collected, analyzed appropriately, and made available in a proactive and
timely manner to all appropriate end users. Prescription data generally include
information on the date written and dispensed, patient, prescriber, pharmacy, medicine,
day’s supply, dose, and source of payment. PDMP reports are made available on request
from end users. These are typically prescribers and pharmacists, but also include medical
licensure boards, law enforcement and drug control agencies, medical examiners, drug
courts, addiction treatment programs, and, in some states, third party payers.
http://www.pdmpexcellence.org/sites/all/pdfs/Brandeis_COE_PDMP_3rd_pty_payer_mtg_rpt.pdf

2.6 The Tension between Treatment of Pain and Regulation of Abuse: The regulatory
ideas inherent in PDMPs and regulation in general, unless implemented with great
subtlety and forethought, will run headlong into the problems both of actually causing
under-treatment and of being accused of causing under-treatment by those eager to
proliferate the use of opioids.
An underlying belief implicit in the creation of PDMPs is that of the “bad
patient”, a villain whose drug-seeking propensities must be held in check by regulation.
Certainly such characters exist (Inciardi et al 2007). An assessment of blame throughout
the entire supply chain for prescription drug abuse, however, must include many other
actors, including doctors, dentists, pharmacists, family members (of both negligent and
well-intentioned types), robbers, and drug pushers (of both criminal and other types).
Chief among the advocates for increased use of opioids are the drug
manufacturers. One specific brand, OxyContin, was marketed with unprecedented vigor
under the (later proved to be false) claim that it had less than a 1% chance of leading to
addiction. After protracted investigations before congress (“EXAMINING THE
EFFECTS OF THE PAINKILLER OXYCONTIN, FOCUSING ON FEDERAL, STATE
AND LOCAL EFFORTS TO DECREASE ABUSE AND MISUSE OF THIS
PRODUCT WHILE ASSURING AVAILABILITY FOR PATIENTS WHO SUFFER
DAILY FROM CHRONIC MODERATE TO SEVERE PAIN” February 12, 2002) the
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manufacturers of OxyContin, Purdue Pharma, eventually pleaded guilty in 2007 to the
criminal charge of “misbranding” the product and agreed to pay $600 million in fines.
By then the damage was done. Furthermore, as part of the settlement, the GAO
(General Accounting Office) recommendations stated, “In addition to developing a risk
management plan, Purdue has initiated several OxyContin-related educational programs.
They have taken disciplinary action against their own sales representatives who they say
improperly promoted OxyContin. They have referred physicians suspected of improper
prescribing practices to the authorities”. In this way they have succeeded in perpetuating
a system by which they, the manufacturers, are allowed to “educate” doctors and others
to market their products. Such education is a major factor in creating a climate of opinion
in which doctors freely prescribe opioids; it began decades ago, and its influence still
persists to this day in medical schools and doctor’s offices.
The role of the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) has been similarly
compromised through “education” and the provision of funding from the pharmaceutical
industry. The FDA approved OxyContin labeling that read, “Delayed absorption, as
provided by OxyContin tablets is believed to reduce the abuse liability of a drug.” In
retrospect it is also clear that the approved labeling contained a recipe for abuse:
OxyContin tablets are to be swallowed whole, and are not
to be broken, chewed, or crushed. Swallowing broken,
chewed, or crushed OxyContin tablets could lead to the
rapid release and absorption of a potentially toxic dose of
oxycodone.
The medical community has long used four primary vital signs: body temperature,
blood pressure, pulse (heart rate), and breathing rate (respiratory rate) to monitor a
patient’s condition. In 1996, coincident with the aggressive marketing of OxyContin, the
American Pain Society (APS) created the idea of “pain as the 5th vital sign”. James
Campbell, in his presidential address, said,
Vital Signs are taken seriously. If pain were assessed with
the same zeal as other vital signs are, it would have a much
better chance of being treated properly. We need to train
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doctors and nurses to treat pain as a vital sign. Quality
care means that pain is measured and treated.
The logic of this syllogism – vital signs are taken seriously; pain is a vital sign;
therefore pain is taken seriously -- so appealed to the Veterans Health Administration
(VHA) that they created a task force to initiate “a comprehensive national strategy for
pain management” based upon it. Thus was born the VHA’s “Pain as the Fifth Vital Sign
Toolkit”
http://www.va.gov/PAINMANAGEMENT/docs/Pain_As_the_5th_Vital_Sign_Toolkit.pdf

Many of us have direct personal experience of the protocol “requiring a pain
intensity rating (0 to 10) at all clinical encounters.” The idea of pain as the 5th vital sign
made so much sense to so many people that it spread like wildfire. It led to proliferation
in the use of opioids, and to patients demanding opioids as a right.
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3. Research Questions
There are clear recurrent trends shown by my literature review of opioid use that lead to
the questions to be addressed in this thesis. For much more than a century people have
persistently used opioids, and during all of that time the use of opioids has been justified
by arguments implying their safety and efficacy. President Nixon was just one in a long
line of apologists claiming extenuating circumstances for continued opioid production.
Purdue Pharma is merely the latest. The historical perspective is therefore that the opioid
problem is likely to prove intractable, and that PDMPs will face familiar pitfalls.

Given that people will use opioids, the pressing questions facing PDMPs become
(1) when should doctors initiate or continue opioids for chronic pain, (2) what are the
appropriate strategies for opioid dosage, duration, and discontinuation, and (3) what are
the risks and harms of opioid use?

Given that people will abuse opioids, which of the possible modalities of abuse
should raise greatest concern? The possibilities include doctor shopping, sharing of drugs
by family and friends, purchase of drugs from dealers, and transitioning from prescription
drugs to heroin.

My review has shown that, before government regulation, many people died or became
terribly addicted to substances whose dangers they did not understand. We are better off
today than before drug control began, but the situation is extremely problematic. Given
that the government has to be involved in regulating drugs, it is imperative that they do so
effectively. The current drug policy from the White House emphasizes specifically that
the preferred intervention for prescription drug abuse should be to improve information
sharing, in other words to establish PDMPs.

Information sharing in the information age naturally means online Prescription
Drug Monitoring Programs. With I-STOP, New York State has mandated the
involvement of prescription writers in PDMPs, along with the pharmacies that fill those
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prescriptions, with a primary intent to fight doctor shopping. A particular focus is the
mandated involvement of prescription writers. Specifically, are PDMPs more effective
when mandatory?

The near-simultaneous launch of PDMPs in almost every state provides important
contrasting data, both because each state has its own perspective on the best way to
proceed, and because the specific problems of the opioid epidemic are different in
different states. The intrinsic opportunities inherent in cross-state comparisons led me to
the methodology used in this thesis.

There are identifiable problems with mandatory regulation. Compliance will
require extra time from the doctors. The extra scrutiny and extra effort may result in
doctors writing fewer legitimate prescriptions. Attempts to curb usage means that people
with legitimate medical needs may not receive medicine.

Which, if any, of the possible metrics for PDMP performance found in the literature
will prove most effective? The possibilities include (1) reports that respond to
requests from a prescriber, a pharmacist, an investigator, a regulatory agency or
another authorized end user of the PDMP, (2) patterns in the data from the PDMP’s
having questionable prescription behaviors, such as consumers who fill prescriptions
in a manner that may indicate inappropriate use of prescription drugs, or the number of
individuals who exceed certain thresholds of prescribers and pharmacies, or the number
of doses of drugs associated with these individuals (3) a prevalence of inappropriate
use of prescription drugs by the general population, or (4) overdoses and deaths
attributable to misuse of controlled substances.

In this thesis I will construct, analyze, calibrate, and extrapolate a system
dynamics model of the opioid epidemic. This research will focus on the following
four questions:
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1. Are Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs an effective tool in curbing opioid
abuse?

2. How does the mandatory use of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs affect
the supply of opioids to long-term pain sufferers, many of whom already contend
that their pain is under-treated?

3. How large a factor in the opioid epidemic is sharing of drugs with family and
friends?

4. Does a System Dynamics analysis provide an adequate description for the onset
and subsequent unfolding of the opioid epidemic?
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4. Methods
4.1 A System Dynamics Approach: In order to evaluate I-STOP and the effectiveness of
PDMPs I will first establish a system dynamics model of prescription drug distribution
and use, and the opioid addiction that results. The model will show how the treatment of
pain and the diversion of drugs interact with each other. Once this model is established
and calibrated, I will introduce into it different instances of PDMPs based on actual
practices within individual US states. For example, some states mandate use of PDMPs
while others do not. These variations in the implementation of PDMPs lead to variation
in outcomes from the model I have created. The resultant set of model outcomes and
extrapolation of the models to more extreme parameter values is the basis for my
sensitivity analysis.

4.2 The Complexities of Addiction: Opioids are addictive, and so, whenever an
individual first takes a prescription pain pill, for whatever reason (legal or illegal, given
by a friend or family member, sold by a drug dealer, stolen, prescribed by a wellintentioned doctor or dentist, delivered as part of post-operative care, or for any other
reason whatsoever), there is a chance of addiction. Therefore a fundamental strategy for
this study will be to follow the trajectory of the pills from creation to consumption, an
approach that will also provide a robust test of my assumption that any exposure to
opioids carries an inherent risk of addiction.
The title of the GAO hearing quoted in section 2.6 contained an interesting
statement of the problem: “…TO DECREASE ABUSE AND MISUSE … WHILE
ASSURING AVAILABILITY FOR PATIENTS WHO SUFFER DAILY FROM
CHRONIC MODERATE TO SEVERE PAIN.”
This is only one of many examples of the kind of dichotomy inherent in the
opioid epidemic: in this case, to decrease supply (abuse) while ensuring supply (to pain
sufferers). In order to tease apart the numerous often-conflicting interests and motives
involved in the opioid epidemic, a useful tactic is to model the extremes of a distribution
as two populations, for example long-term and short-term pain sufferers, heavy and light
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drug users, under-supplied and over-supplied patients, parsimonious and profligate
prescribers, and so on. This simplifying assumption proves sufficient to explain important
trends, and facilitates construction of a model simple enough to appreciate intuitively yet
robust enough to make specific policy predictions, in line with the standards and
expectations of the System Dynamics modeling community (Sterman 2000).
The literature on the opioid epidemic abounds with examples of presuppositions
that result from narrowness of focus regarding such inherently dichotomous distributions,
when typically only one half of the distribution is considered. Examples include the
stigmatization of some opioid dependent patients as blameworthy rather than as
inadvertent and unknowing victims, and the failure to appreciate that some doctor
shoppers want more drugs to treat their pain while others want more drugs to sell from
their prescriptions for financial gain. Another important reason to build a system
dynamics model is to address dichotomous issues of this kind.
Tracking the prescription drugs from the doctors’ offices leads directly to two
kinds of opioid patients. The first are those with long-term pain and increasing tolerance
to opioids. The second are those with short-term needs from sports injury, dental
procedures, minor surgery, falls, and so on. On first examination it might seem sufficient
to model the latter class of patients as the source for all proliferation of opioids into
society, simply because they often have pills left over from their prescription. Meanwhile
the long-term pain patients, especially because they become increasingly habituated to
the drug over time, will generally consume all of their prescriptions.
While this is perhaps a reasonable first approximation, the reality is considerably
more complex. Long-term pain sufferers may choose to sell some or all their prescription,
suffer targeted theft, or choose to give pills to friends and family despite the pain
(Inciardi et al 2007). Some short-term pain patients may dispose of their prescription pill
excesses responsibly (Baumblatt et al 2014).
For the purposes of modeling I therefore distinguish two trajectories from the
doctors’ office: one into homes with a de facto excess of pills available for distribution,
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and the other into homes where the primary users consumes the entire prescription. The
fraction of prescriptions entering each of these two channels is empirically determinable
through comparison between the model and published data. There are huge variations in
the numerical value of this fraction from place to place and over time. Factors including
the doctors’ susceptibility to persistent marketing and their prior education regarding
opioids, the rate at which doctors write prescriptions, and the number of prescriptions
they write per patient all affect the number of pills leaving their offices. Meanwhile the
activities of the patients in requiring drugs (such as feigning pain, doctor shopping,
current degree of opioid dependency, or refusing to take opioids because of concerns
about their risks) affect the number of pills received by patients.
Evidence accumulated over the past two decades shows the use of opioids in the
United States springing up in isolated pockets, increasing over time, and spreading into
adjacent geographic regions exactly like a contagious disease, and therefore amply
justifying the term “epidemic” to describe its course.
4.3 Lessons from Prior Epidemics: Prior drug epidemics have been successfully
modeled (Everingham & Rydell, 1994; Caulkins, 2002) by the assumed existence of two
populations of users (usually called “light users” and “heavy users”) initiated into drug
use and so entering the light user class, with a few subsequently escalating over time into
heavy use. The ability of such simple models to fit the data on initiation and use (of
cocaine in the references cited), using only three parameters (rate of quitting from light
use, escalation from light to heavy use, and rate of quitting from heavy use) is impressive,
and part of the inspiration for the approach taken in this work.

Figure 2: Model #1. Implementation of the Everingham & Rydell and Caulkins model.
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My implementation of the Everingham & Rydell and Caulkins model is shown in
Fig 2. The arrow on the left side of the figure indicates the boundary of the model,
beginning with initiation. As expected, my implementation (Model #1) can successfully
reproduce the published results of Everingham & Rydell (1994) and Caulkins (2002). In
subsequent sections of this thesis I will model the system that causes and sustains the
opioid epidemic. With that model in hand, I will then be in position to investigate the
effectiveness of PDMPs through sensitivity analyses within the world of the model in
which variables that describe the behavior of the actors in the model are adjusted between
two perceived extremes.
4.4 Modeling the Opioid Epidemic: I begin my modeling of opioid addiction with a
specific focus on illicit use. Time series data documenting the rate of initiation into the
illicit use of opioids (http://www.samhsa.gov/data/) are published annually, as are death
rates from opioid poisoning (CDC_Deaths.pdf). Having developed a preliminary model
for the addiction component of the system, I proceed to construct the rest of the opioid
epidemic system model in a series of logical steps. In particular, I add components to the
system motived by answers to three questions:
• Where specifically are the doctor-prescribed drugs consumed or hoarded?
• When the user’s appetite grows, where do the additional drugs come from?
• If doctors, having habituated their patients, turn off the supply, how will their patients
react?

Despite a welter of confusion about possible causes, effects, and trends in the
published opioid epidemic literature, I found it possible to identify a set of six selfconsistent assumptions, listed below, from which I built my system dynamics model in
several steps. Working in steps helped me to think through the logic of the model.
Calibration of the variables in the model will be accomplished from comparison with
published data once the logical interconnections of the model are all in place.
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The six assumptions underlying my System Dynamics modeling are:

1. A population exposed to opioids exhibits dependency and death at an empirically
determinable rate. The original reason for exposure to opioids is not a factor.

2. When the number of pills prescribed exceeds patient needs, exposure of family
and friends leads to non-medical use. Initially the excess of pills is greater than
any demand for this diversion of supply.

3. Recreational users supplied by family and friends give pills to their peers. Initially
the excess of pills is greater than any demand for this diversion of supply.

4. As tolerance to the drug grows in an individual dependent user, doctor shopping
arises in order to meet increasing individual need.

5. For long-term pain sufferers who develop dependency, their supply from a single
doctor becomes insufficient to meet their needs. Patients with expectations that
this need should be fulfilled within the medical system voice complaints about
under-treatment while the world nevertheless sees an ongoing epidemic.

6. The purity and reputable source of pharmaceutical opioids makes them preferable
to heroin when they are free and readily available. When cost and scarcity become
factors, use of heroin (which is cheaper but riskier) rises.

Step 1 implements my assumption number 1: A population exposed to opioids exhibits
dependency and death at an empirically determinable rate. The original reason for
exposure to opioids is not a factor.
I first extended the model of Figure 2 to begin consideration of opioid deaths,
shown in Figure 3. The input data (initial use of illicit drugs, http://www.samhsa.gov/data/ )
are entered into the model through tabulation in a text file (called OpioidTimeSeries) that
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lists year and annual initiation rate. The inclusion of a mortality rate for heavy users
(called rate of heavy users dying) completes this naïve opioid addiction and death model.
The reason for the omission of a mortality rate for light users is explained below.

Figure 3: Model #2 Light and Heavy Users; Deaths from Heavy User Population

What values should be used for the rates of quitting from light and heavy drug
use, and for the rate of escalation to investigate the opioid data? Close examination of the
epidemic trend lines gives a clue. Both the opioid prescription rate and the opioid death
rate had been slowly growing since the 1970s but an abrupt steepening, signaling the
onset of the epidemic, happened around the year 2000.
The uptick in prescription rate from aggressive OxyContin marketing surged in
1997 (as data from the GAO hearings, described in section 2.6, confirm). Equally clearly,
the sudden change in slope of the death rates trajectory happened later: specifically, in the
year 2001. This lag in response is characteristic of stock and flow models, where
accumulation (in this case, of opioid users) precedes an observed flow (here “deaths”).
That is, in a model of this kind, it takes some time for users to transition to the points of
addiction, overdose, and death.

The data from the cocaine epidemic of the 1980s (cited above) showed similar
behavior. Because both cocaine use and opioid use lead to physiological addiction, I
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hypothesized that the rate coefficients might be similar in the two epidemics, and so I had
the idea to begin with precisely those (cocaine-determined) escalation and quitting
parameters as a first guess with which to attempt to model the opioid data.

Figure 4: Model #2 output vs CDC data
Graphs of number of heavy users of opioids and number of light users of opioids
generated from this model are shown in figure 4 (upper). Because the appearance of the
curves for each of these two classes of users turns out to be significantly different, a
simple comparison of the appearance of these graphs with a plot of annual number of
deaths from opioids (figure 4, center, dashed line) yields an interesting result -- the model
curve for the number of heavy users of opioids is similar in appearance (in both time of
onset and rate of increase) to the curve for number of deaths. Yet the curve for number of
light users of opioids -- specifically, with regard to the time of onset of the steep rise in
numbers of opioid users and the persistence of upward trend all the way to the end of the
time line – is very different.
Therefore, within this simple model, and assuming a constant rate of deaths per
user population, the deaths are found to arise preponderantly from the heavy user
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population. This allows an immediate calculation of a value for my model parameter
“rate of death of heavy user” from a ratio of the death rate to the number of heavy users.
That ratio is indeed constant with time (the curves of the two quantities are the same
shape) and corresponds to an annual probability of one death per 133 heavy users.

This numerical result from my model can be directly compared with data
presented by Dr. Tom Frieden, the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC). (http://ireta.org/2015/04/07/high-risk-opioid-use/)

Figure 5: Infographic from Dr. Tom Frieden of the CDC
Even though Director Frieden’s model is a static “snapshot” and my model is
dynamic -- from a comparison between the numerical result of my model calculation (one
death per 133 heavy users) and the data from figure 5 (115 who abuse/are dependent per
death) -- it seems reasonable to conclude that the “heavy users” in my model can
reasonably be equated those “who abuse/are dependent” in Director Frieden’s model.

There are two obvious shortcomings in my model of addiction to this point. I have
considered only illicit drug use, and I have used the rates from the cocaine model. I will
later remedy the first defect below by modeling the rate of opioid initiation from the
published prescription rates, but before doing that I will consider the question of whether
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it is possible to find published research that determines appropriate rates directly from the
opioid data themselves.
In their paper “Epidemiological evidence on extra-medical use of prescription
pain relievers: transitions from newly incident use to dependence among 12–21 year olds
in the United States using meta-analysis, 2002–13”, Parker & Anthony write,

In this report, by joining previously published age-specific
estimates for prevalence of EMPPR [Extra-medical pain
prescription reliever] use with this study’s newly published
age-specific estimates of incidence rates through 2013, it
has been possible to discover that for the most part the
mean duration of extra-medical PPR [pain prescription
reliever] use is on the order of 2–4 year…
The rate coefficient from the cocaine model for light users quitting, and therefore
also the rate in my opioid model, is 0.28/year, implying a duration of use of the inverse of
this number, that is 1/0.28 = 3.6 years, in good agreement with Parker & Anthony.

Parker & Anthony also report,
Previously published estimates suggest that many
EMPPR users try these compounds no more than a
few times and then stop, with duration far shorter
than the estimated mean, whereas others become
persistent users, with duration considerably longer
than the estimated mean (e.g., those who become
opioid dependence cases).
In other words, a few light opioid users escalate to become heavy users. The
escalation rate I used, 0.04/year, is again consistent with the range given by Parker &
Anthony.

I therefore conclude that it is justified to continue to include my simple model of
addiction as a component of my larger system model. My search of the literature failed to
find any description of potential similarities between the dynamics of the present opioid
epidemic and those of the cocaine epidemic of the 1980’s and 90’s. Therefore, as far as I
can determine, my comparison of these two epidemics (cocaine and opioid) represents a
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novel contribution. Furthermore, my model result regarding exposure to opioids is
consistent with my primary assumption: that any exposure to opioids carries an
inherent risk of addiction.
Step 2 implements my assumptions number 2 and 3: When the number of pills
prescribed exceeds patient needs, exposure of family and friends leads to non-medical
use. Initially the excess of pills is greater than any demand for this diversion of supply.
Recreational users supplied by family and friends give pills to their peers. Initially the
excess of pills is greater than any demand for this diversion of supply.
That the number of pills available within the population exceeds the needs of
those to whom they were prescribed is vividly demonstrated by the astonishing
amount of drugs turned in at so-called “take-back” events (figure 6). These opioids
are dispensed in units of tens of milligrams per dose, and returned in units of
thousands of pounds left over.

Figure 6: Drugs collected at a Tennessee “take back” event

https://tn.gov/assets/entities/behavioral-health/sa/attachments/Prescription_For_Success_Full_Report.pdf

My model for this wild excess of pills in the population is shown in the upper
half of the diagram in figure 7 -- while the lower half of the diagram attaches to the
addiction module developed in step 1.
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Figure 7: Model #3: Supply of pills is abundant, friends and family are supplied
From the prescription rate, I determine new initiates to opioid use as a
fraction of the number of prescriptions written (assuming the rise in prescription
rate is largely a consequence of new patients, consistent with this being an epidemic
situation). The fraction of those new opioid patients who do not require all of their
pills (do not have long term pain) are held responsible in the model for exposure of
family and friends to the excess pills (in medicine cabinets, for example).
The product of three variables within this model -- “mean fraction of new
patients per prescription”, (1 – “fraction of patients with long-term pain”), and “rate of
use per home with extra pills per year” -- determines the normalization of the output
parameter “opioid deaths per 100,000”, and the three parameters can be adjusted
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until a good fit is obtained to the published data. Figure 8 shows the result from a
typical run.

Figure 8: Input to and output from a typical run of model #3
Although it was a useful step in developing my thinking, this model is of very
limited use both because it is seriously incomplete and because it only captures one
of the possibilities regarding where the prescriptions go; therefore I will not
consider it further, but will proceed directly to the inclusion of the rest of my six
assumptions into a completed model.
One parameter I used in this model #4, enclosed here in parentheses (1 fraction of patients with long-term pain), might seem a clumsy choice (why not
“fraction of patients with no long-term pain”?), yet it was chosen this way in this
model characterization of drug diversion to friends and family for a very specific
reason. Patients with long-term pain generally will not have pills to share. It is well
documented that opioid addiction progresses in the case of long-term use by way of
ever-increasing doses as tolerance to the drug grows: below (section 4.5) I will
describe a survey of deaths in Utah in which decedents routinely sought more drugs
than their first doctor provided. Which brings me to the next step in building a
model of the opioid epidemic system.
Step 3 implements my assumptions number 4, 5 and 6: As tolerance to the
drug grows in an individual dependent user, doctor shopping arises in order to meet
increasing individual need. For long-term pain sufferers who develop dependency,
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their supply from a single doctor becomes insufficient to meet their needs. Patients
with expectations that this need should be fulfilled within the medical system voice
complaints about under-treatment while the world nevertheless sees an ongoing
epidemic. The purity and reputable source of pharmaceutical opioids makes them
preferable to heroin when they are free and readily available. When cost and scarcity
become factors, use of heroin (which is cheaper but riskier) rises.
At this point I include all six assumptions of my model, as shown in figure 9.
Now the distinction implied by the parameter “fraction of patients with long-term
pain” becomes fully explicated. Parallel to the “oversupply” stock and flow that I
introduced in the previous model above, I now add a “potential undersupply” stock
and flow for the patients with long term pain, whose growing habituation and longterm need for pain relief are the perennial driver toward higher doses, and
therefore potential undersupply and collateral risk of death. Taken together, the
oversupply and undersupply channels consume all the pills: there is simultaneously
a glut and a shortage.

Figure 9: Model #4 of the epidemic system based on my six underlying assumptions
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In an important refinement from the model of figure 7, I found it was preferable to
enter the data on prescription rate by using the year-over-year increase rather than the rate
itself; this led to a more straightforward formulation of the parameter called “initiation” -that is, to the part of the model that describes transition from light to heavy drug use –
which was easier to compare with published data for the purpose of calibration.

The rest of the assumptions made in building this version of my model are
straightforward. Long-term pain patients naturally complain about the pain when they are
under-supplied relative to their growing tolerance and increasing need. They seek more
prescriptions from other doctors, becoming “doctor shoppers”. Also joining the ranks of
doctor shoppers are those heavy users whose habit was initiated through exposure to
opioids by family and friends.

A nice point of modeling arises here, in that a person who has never seen a doctor,
yet who joins the ranks of heavy users using illicit opioids, might well now be driven by
addiction to seek a doctor’s prescription, and will almost certainly receive one -- given no
prior record within the system and presenting as being in pain. I call such a person a
doctor shopper, as logic demands; but the algorithms of a PDMP will not detect such an
individual, and indeed will only discover the most egregious examples. The model
suggests that the number of “one doctor shoppers” may in fact be large, a situation
perhaps to be expected in the midst of an epidemic of addiction in a medical system that
denies the prevalence of addiction.
The parameter called “likelihood doctor will prescribe to a shopper” allows me to
model the number of doctor shoppers, and will later serve as a point of inclusion for
PDMPs because, in the case of an ideal PDMP (of which none presently exist), this
parameter would take the value zero. Addiction then drives thwarted would-be doctor
shoppers to go in search of heroin. Some (perhaps many) heavy users will not even
attempt doctor shopping -- but will go directly towards heroin, driven to do so by
considerations of cost.
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4.5 Calibrating the Model with Real World Data: Tennessee suffers the misfortune of
having one of the most severe cases of over-prescription of opioids in the nation, and so it
has been closely studied. In order to calibrate a baseline model against which to compare
the differences between states I will therefore use data from the state of Tennessee. One
especially useful set of data comes from a five-year-long, complete, statewide sample in
which Baumblatt et al (2014) conducted a matched case-control study (matching
deceased opioid victims with living patients from the state database) finding that

From January 1, 2007, through December 31, 2011, onethird of the population of Tennessee filled an opioid
prescription each year, and opioid prescription rates
increased from 108.3 to 142.5 per 100 population per year.
Among all patients in Tennessee prescribed opioids during
2011, 7.6% used more than 4 prescribers, 2.5% used more
than 4 pharmacies, and 2.8% had a mean daily dosage
greater than 100 MME’s [Morphine Milligram
Equivalents]. Increased risk of opioid-related overdose
death was associated with 4 or more prescribers (adjusted
odds ratio [aOR], 6.5; 95% CI, 5.1-8.5), 4 or more
pharmacies (aOR, 6.0; 95% CI, 4.4-8.3), and more than
100 MMEs (aOR, 11.2; 95% CI, 8.3-15.1). Persons with 1
or more risk factor accounted for 55% of all overdose
deaths.
The Baumblatt et al analysis did not consider the system dynamics of the epidemic. In
fact few studies of the system dynamics exist in the literature, as I will discuss below.
My analysis of these same data therefore addresses a unique aspect of the epidemic in
Tennessee that has received relatively little scrutiny.
CHR

ETR

JMR

KKR

MCR

MSR

NDR

NER

SCR

SER

SUL

UCR

WTR

2007

99.5

133.1

93.3

103.9

86.1

60.7

81.9

134.8

114.1

129.7

131.4

120.8

116.2

2008

112.6

154.3

107.9

116.6

95.7

68.8

93.3

152.2

127.6

146.7

151.7

139.9

131.9

2009

115.3

157.5

117.5

117

100.5

69.2

97.6

158

130.6

154.7

161.1

145.4

134.8

2010

120.6

162.5

114.9

119.6

103.9

69.6

99.5

157

139.5

163.6

160

149.6

138.6

2011

134

176.7

123.4

130.6

112

76

106

179.7

150.3

177.1

179.9

162.8

142

Table 2: Tennessee Prescription Rate per 100 Population by Health Department Regions
2007- 2011: data from Prescription Opioid Use and. Opioid-Related Overdose Death —
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TN, 2009–2010. Jane A.G. Baumblatt, MD. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
https://www.etsu.edu/.../Baumblatt%204
In Table 2 the prescription rate is tabulated by Health Department Regions, whose
geographic distribution within the state is shown in Figure 10.

Figure 10: Tennessee Health Department Regions

Table 2 shows that the annual rate of prescriptions is high (more than 100
prescriptions per 100 population) and varies by almost of factor of three from highest to
lowest. (For comparison, the average rate per state varies from a low of 53 to a high of
143.) When I plot the Tennessee regions (figure 11), the rates are seen to be increasing in
every district across the five-year timeline.
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Figure 11: Tennessee Prescription Rate by Health Department Regions 2007- 2011
The overdose death rate for 2008-2011 is also available from the same source, as follows:
CHR

ETR

JMR

KKR

MCR

MSR

NDR

NER

SCR

SER

SUL

UCR

WTR

9.9

3.1

13.4

6.1

3.1

7.7

10.8

9.2

9.1

6.5

10.6

7.2

2008

9.2

2009

6.3

12

1

10.2

5

5.5

8.1

8.7

8.9

10.9

9.8

10.8

7.1

2010

4.1

13.2

2

11.8

6.3

5.8

9.9

9.2

7.7

11.4

5.9

11.9

7.4

2011

7.2

13.8

6

10.8

8.1

3.3

10

13.5

8.4

13.8

10.4

17.1

9.8

Table 3: Tennessee Overdose Death Rate per 100,000 Population by Health Department
Regions 2008-2011: data from Prescription Opioid Use and. Opioid-Related Overdose
Death — TN, 2009–2010. Jane A.G. Baumblatt, MD. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention. https://www.etsu.edu/.../Baumblatt%204

Figure 12: Regions with higher prescription rates have higher death rates
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In Figure 12 I binned the data from tables 2 and 3 into four bins from lowest to
highest prescription rate (based on the 2011 rate) -- see the legend on the right. The
reason for binning the data was to demonstrate that there is a trend towards higher death
rates where prescription rates are higher. This tendency is present in every case I have
examined, not only in Tennessee.
Two plausible explanations for this trend in the data are (1) opioid patients in
some regions are prescribed successively larger amounts over time in the form of
additional prescriptions, and the larger dose kills them – consistent with Baumblatt’s
conclusion, quoted above, that a dose of more than 100 MMEs (aOR, 11.2; 95% CI, 8.315.1) is a risk factor; and/or (2) that new patients are added within the population over
time, and since each opioid patient has a risk of dying, the death rate therefore rises. Both
of these factors are present as parameters in my model.

The reason why I chose Tennessee for the initial calibration of my model now
comes into sharper focus, because data exist to identify not only the contributions of
these two factors but also the third and final variable that deconstructs how the input of
prescriptions flows into my model: that third parameter is the mean number of patients
per prescription.

2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Patients Prescriptions Pharmacies
1761168
6272409
1760
1913416
7176542
1801
1959246
7460239
1827
1959923
7739698
1885
2024551
8449105
1919

Providers
14828
15525
16316
17054
17555

Table 4: the total numbers of unique patients, unique prescriptions, unique pharmacies,
and unique providers for each year from 2007 through 2011 from the Tennessee
Controlled Substances Monitoring Program (TNCSMP); data from Prescription Opioid
Use and. Opioid-Related Overdose Death — TN, 2009–2010. Jane A.G. Baumblatt, MD.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. https://www.etsu.edu/.../Baumblatt%204
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From Table 4, it is straightforward to calculate the following values for my model
of Tennessee:
Mean number of patients per prescription

4.0

Annual rate of increase of patients

3.3%

Annual rate of increase of prescriptions

6.4%

Annual rate of increase of pharmacies dispensing

2.1%

Annual rate of increase of providers

3.9%

Table 5: Input parameters for Tennessee model, calculated from TNCSMP data

From Table 5 it is also straightforward to calculate the change in number of
patients and the change in number of prescriptions over time. The ratio of these two
quantities is found to differ by a factor of two from the quantity mean number of patients
per prescription, a result that is simply interpreted to mean that half of the growth in
prescriptions written between 2007 and 2011 is due to more patients in the population,
and the other half to more opioids per patient.

I will assume these numbers calculated from the Tennessee data for my baseline
model, and now proceed to find data to calibrate the remaining parameters of my model
for the entire opioid system.

Modeling the factors underlying the death rate. The astonishing glut of
prescriptions distributed nationally leads to a lot of deaths, and because a lot of people die
from opioid overdose, I expected to find a lot of survey data about the circumstances of
those people who died: were they taking the drug as prescribed by their doctor, or did
they obtain the drug illegally? In fact, I found only two rigorous surveys, details of which
can be summarized as follows:
In West Virginia only 44.4% of the 295 who died had been prescribed the
drugs that killed them, while in Utah 87.4% of the 254 deceased had been
prescribed prescription pain medication in the year before they died, almost all
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(91.8%) from a healthcare source. Yet in both cases strong evidence of drug
misuse, diversion, and doctor shopping were also present.
The large difference between these two surveys – that in one state the majority of
deaths were from drug abuse, while in the other state most resulted quite directly from
doctors’ prescriptions – indicates the presence of that large state-to-state variation in
prescription drug abuse that I anticipated in choosing my research topic. Less formal
information, in the form of innumerable anecdotal accounts no less heart-rending for their
lack of rigor, confirms this same trend across the nation. Some people come to opioids
through prescriptions from their doctor, while others get them elsewhere – frequently
from friends and family. This fact is clearly established through surveys of the living
regarding their drug use:

Figure 13: Sources of prescription opioids for non-medical use
http://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/prescribing.html
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The Utah survey is important because almost all of the subjects (87.4%) fall into
the “doctor-initiated” category, and yet widespread signs of addiction are clearly seen.
This is a survey of close relatives of the people who died, giving an intimate glimpse into
the realities of the opioid epidemic -- a complete and unbiased survey that finds 75% of
those close relatives had expressed concern about medication use even though the
deceased got their drugs as prescriptions from their doctors. They were right to be
concerned, because 52.9% had taken pills more often than their prescription specified;
31.6% had obtained prescriptions from more than one doctor during the previous year;
and 29.8% had used for reasons other than treating pain, almost half of which “to get
high”.

In contrast, the West Virginia survey had a minority of doctor-initiated users
(44.4%). This sample had pharmaceutical diversion in 63.1% of the deaths, and doctor
shopping in 21.4%. The rate of doctor shopping was therefore less in the West Virginia
sample than in the Utah sample. That is, those who got their first opioids from doctors
continued to get their drugs from doctors as their appetite for the drugs grew, in line with
the fact that people think drugs they get from their doctors are safe.

The fraction of drug diverters in the West Virginia survey of deaths was so large
that it was possible to investigate the age distribution within the sample. Drug diversion
was greatest among those aged 18 -24 and decreased across each successive age
group. This age distribution for diversion, skewed as it is to younger users in West
Virginia, is significantly different from the national average (figure 14), again
demonstrating significant variations from state to state.
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Figure 14: National average of opioid overdose death rates by age group
http://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/overdose.html

This variation in the age distribution of opioid deaths by geographic region is a
key indicator of a crucial factor in the epidemic. The press is full of reports of young
people abusing drugs (like those who died in West Virginia), and yet the national average
distribution of those who die peaks in the age range of 45 – 54 years old (Figure 14).
Earlier, I learned from Baumblatt et al (2014) that higher doses of opioids “more
than 100 MMEs (aOR, 11.2; 95% CI, 8.3-15.1)” are a risk factor for death. I struggled to
find data on dosage levels until I found the information I needed outside of the peerreviewed literature in a report called “A Nation in Pain” written by Express Scripts
Holding Company, a pharmacy claims processing business. In fact Express Scripts is the
largest pharmacy benefit management (PBM) organization in the United States, with
2013 revenues of $104.62 billion, and so the sample size for these data, while not
explicitly stated, is probably very large. Figure 15 shows the age distribution of patients
receiving 120 mg or more opioid more than 50% of the time.
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Figure 15: Patients receiving 120 mg or more opioid more than 50% of the time

A Nation in Pain also reports that

The quantity of opioids contained in each prescription increased
for both women and men over the study period, rising 6.5% in five
years.
Taken together, the data in this section hint at an alarming dichotomy that
deserves much more study, namely that young people are in most jeopardy from
diverted drugs and that older people are in most jeopardy from their prescribed
drugs. This is perhaps not surprising based on the assumptions doctors make about
doctor shoppers and drug seekers. Many doctors assume they know what doctor shoppers
look like, which is in part why PDMP participation is low when voluntary systems are in
place. Doctors know best, in their own minds. Yet the doctors’ frequent assumption that
doctor shoppers are young is incorrect. Many turn out to be middle age or senior citizens,
as the Utah survey showed. Furthermore, older people statistically are more likely to be
prescribed multiple drugs, and the prospect of drug interaction must be factored in;
specifically, benzodiazepines are known to be hazardous in combination with opioids.

Although not a prescription drug, alcohol is also known to pose a similar hazard.
That drug interaction is a very significant problem, has been demonstrated by a very large
statistical analysis from the year 2010: of the 92,209 emergency room opioid overdose
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cases reviewed by Yokell et al (2014), 23.2% had a concurrent diagnosis of acute
benzodiazepine intoxication, and 7.6% of acute alcohol intoxication.

(Footnote: This rate of alcohol intoxication is not elevated relative to national levels of
alcoholism, and so cannot reasonably be expected to be lowered further by any policy
intervention aimed at prescription drugs. The fact that approximately a quarter of
emergency room case are found to be under the influence of other prescription drugs is
very troubling, however, and offers a clear possibility for effective intervention, which
could be a highly effective addition to the best practices of PDMPs.
-- end of footnote)

In my baseline model I will set the parameter fraction of patients who use every
pill at the middle of its range (0.5), because the data presented above clearly indicate that
both the “oversupply” and the “undersupply” channels of the model are populated, yet the
values for West Virginia and Utah, for example, are clearly different. The sensitivity
analyses below will address this question further.

The number of new extra-medical users per year can be modeled using the very
same data on first use of illicit opioids that I used earlier when first developing my model
of addiction (Model #2 in Figure 3), this time predicting that rate of first use from the
prescription rate. This happens in the model by drug diversion. Specifically, from the
number of prescriptions the model calculates the number of homes with an excess of pills,
from which the diversion of prescriptions is estimated (I set the baseline model at a value
of 50% of the homes suffering diversion of a prescription), and finally multiply by a
factor called proliferation of pills that accounts for the fact that prescriptions comprise a
bottle of pills, but sharing (probably) happens by the pill. I will vary proliferation of pills
but strictly mathematically I could equally well vary the number of homes suffering
diversion because only the product of these two terms enters: I modeled the situation with
this apparently redundant parameter in order to make explicit the counting of number of
prescriptions on one hand, and the number of pills on the other.
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When the value of the parameter proliferation of pills is set to a value of 4 the
model number of non-medical users is similar to the data (Figure 16). The difference in
detail between the shapes of the two curves may be an artifact of the precision of the data
or demonstrate a limitation of this simple model. Both because the shapes of the two
curves are somewhat different, and because I will consider not the absolute values of
parameters like this one but rather the effect of changing them from the baseline model
values in my sensitivity analyses below there is little motivation to make any further
attempt at a best fit for a model like this. I will discuss the issue of goodness of fit in
system dynamics models below.
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Figure 16: The model can approximate the number of non-medical users given the
prescription rate as input when proliferation of pills is set to a value of 4.

The model value for rate of shortfall per patient per year modulates the number
of shortfalls and complaints which also depends on the (calculated) number of Long-term
patients who use every pill prescribed, and so have long-term access issues. The number
of long term pain sufferers complaining of under-treatment numbers 1.1 million (ref), and
that value is matched by my model for rate of shortfall per patient per year = 0.15/year.

I now proceed to set all of the baseline parameters to the values established in this
section. Running the model now gives a prediction for opioid deaths per 100,000 that
matches the published data when the rate of heavy users dying =0.004, a value almost a
- 52 -

factor of two different from that obtained from my naïve model #2; but that earlier model
#2 was incomplete, because it did not include first use of opioids by patients with
prescriptions. Its sole purpose having been served in allowing an early approximation to
the modeling of addiction, model #2 will not be considered further.

The number of heroin users in the country is variously estimated to be between
60,000 and a million. When I set rate of heavy users affected by price to 0.1/year, the
number of heavy users per year who switch to heroin because of price in the model has a
value of 300,000 in 2010. This is comfortably within the target range, and so these
parameters are adopted into the baseline model.

The rate at which heavy users seek extra prescriptions is unknown. People who
become habituated to illicit (diverted) prescription opioids and then go to see a doctor for
more are almost invisible to the present medical system. If such a person tells a doctor
that his or her back hurts, having no prior prescriptions, that person will probably get
opioids. For the baseline model I set the rate at which heavy users seek extra
prescriptions = 0.5/year. These people are doctor shoppers, and yet are not countable by
any PDMP algorithm. They do make a contribution to my model, however, and so their
contribution will contribute fully in my sensitivity analyses below. This is a good
example of the kind of effect that might be elucidated from a system dynamics model, but
not from a more static statistical analysis.
Baseline model parameter
fraction of prescriptions that represent dose increase
mean number of patients per prescription
fraction of patients who use every pill
proliferation of pills
rate of shortfall per patient per year
rate of use per home with extra pills per year
rate at which heavy users seek extra prescriptions
rate of heavy users affected by price
likelihood doctor will prescribe to shopper

Value
0.5
0.25
0.5
4
0.15
0.5
0.5
0.1
0.5

Table 6: Parameter values for the baseline model
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The final parameter requiring calibration in my model is likelihood doctor will
prescribe to shopper. This parameter changes downwards by design when PDMPs are
introduced, and declines further when PDMPs become mandatory. I will adopt a midrange value of 0.5 for the baseline model, in order to accommodate extreme variations in
either direction from this mid-point. In particular, pill mills and ideal PDMP regulation
lie at opposite ends of this range.

A first test of the performance of baseline model can be conducted by using the
data from Tennessee for the various Health Department Regions. Earlier, in order to
demonstrate the correlation between prescription rates and death rates region by region, I
was obliged to bin the data, because the death rate data are based on relative small
numbers (in the sense of statistics, not humanity) and so are noisy. The prescription rates,
however, are based on much bigger numbers, and are not nearly so noisy. Therefore I can
usefully run the time series prescription rate data (Table 1) through my model to predict
death rates region by region. (Because I use year over year increase as the input, I first
extrapolated the data back to the beginning of the epidemic using the shape of the
national prescription rate trend as a template.) The actual death rates (binned, as before)
are plotted in the left frame of Fig 17, and the model death rates (less noisy because
predicted by the model from prescription rates) are plotted in the right frame. One
parameter, rate of death of heavy user, was varied to create this fit, and it was necessary
to double the value relative to the baseline model. Higher doses are a risk factor, and per
capita consumption is high in TN; of course, other explanations are possible, as I will
explore further below.

Fig 17: death rates, data as a function of prescription rates (left); model death rates (right)
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5. Findings
5.1 Learning about System Dynamics Models: I decided to investigate a System
Dynamics model for this study (1) because there is evidence for time delays between
cause and effect in the opioid epidemic, (2) because of the accumulation of stocks and
flows within the system of opioid distribution, and (3) because I had read that System
Dynamics models are considered an effective tool in the study of epidemics. As described
in section 4.2, the data show that it is accurate to describe the opioid crisis as an epidemic
because opioid abuse is seen springing up in isolated pockets, increasing over time, and
spreading into adjacent geographic regions exactly like a contagious disease.
I therefore identified a software package to meet my modeling needs. The
software I chose to use, Vensim, comes with many useful learning examples
(https://www.researchgate.net/figure/277158047_fig1_Figure-1-Stock-flow-diagram-fora-simple-epidemic-model) including models of epidemics such as Figure 18.
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rate of potential
infectious contacts
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fraction infected
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rate that people
contact other people

Susceptible
Population

initial susceptible

infections

Infected
Population

initial infected
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Figure 18: A Stock-flow diagram for a simple epidemic model
As I learned to use the software by studying examples like this, I asked myself
which of the many variables and interconnections that were raised by my literature search
could form the basis for my model of the opioid epidemic. I wondered how I would know
that I had chosen “correctly”. I tried to use Figure 18 as an inspiration for my own work. I
thought initially that a “good” model would surely have many interlocking feedback
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loops. As I worked to develop such a feedback-dominated model, the first effort I
produced was the model shown in Figure 19. It provided me with a major surprise.

Figure 19: An unsuccessful System Dynamic model of the opioid epidemic
The concept underlying figure 19 is that the doctors and their patients infect each
other with the idea of opioids as a panacea for pain relief, and that the spread of this
infectious idea leads to the writing of the many opioid prescriptions that fuel the
epidemic. Comparison of figure 19 with my final model presented earlier (chapter 4,
figure 9) shows that the two are very different in detail, because they are based on very
different philosophies. Yet they contain many of the same individual elements.

The model in figure 19 turns out to have a fundamental problem. Through
repeated attempts, I discovered that it is not possible to fit the data with this kind of
model including any of its variants that I constructed. I was astonished by this failure. To
be candid I had thought it was inevitable that any sufficiently complicated diagram would
yield a fit. Or equivalently, I might say that I underestimated system dynamics. I thought
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perhaps it was little more that a clever didactic tool to illustrate relationships within an
interconnected system. I spent a lot of time trying to adjust the interconnections and
relationships of figure 19 to fit my data, until repeated failure and further reading led me
to a very different perspective. The paper crucial to my improved understanding of the
issues was “Optimisation of System Dynamic Models” (Dangerfield 2009), which
specifically addresses the example of the model in figure 18. Dangerfield writes

A separate improvement to the model may be sought where
it is required to fit the model to past time series data.
Optimisation here involves minimising a statistical function
which expresses how well the model fits a time-series of
data pertaining to an important model variable. In other
words a vector of parameters are explored with a view to
determining the particular parameter combination which
offers the best fit between the chosen important model
variable and a past time series dataset of this variable. This
type of optimisation might be generically termed model
calibration.
Dangerfield’s identification of the fundamental role of calibration proved to be
key to my building a successful model. I shifted my focus to follow the trajectory of the
drugs themselves, using the rate of prescriptions written as the time-series of data from
which the rest of my model should flow. From the perspective offered by Dangerfield, it
became clear that the ability to calibrate my baseline model (chapter 4) is an important
validation of the model’s appropriateness and usefulness. Specifically, my baseline model
fits the national averages for prescription rate of opioids and death rates due to opioid
poisoning. This simple model includes over-prescription by doctors, recreational drug
use, drug diversion, doctor shopping, under treatment of pain, escalation to the use of
heroin, addiction, dependency, and death. In the language of Dangerfield, my baseline
model is “the particular parameter combination which offers the best fit” to the time
series of the prescription data.

When the parameters of this model are varied away from the baseline values, we
enter the realm of “what if”, because the baseline model fits the real world data, and so
variations shift us into a hypothetical, imaginary domain of “what might have happened”.
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It is of course useful to consider such parameter variations, so that each of the driving
factors in the model can be studied in detail in a series of “what if” scenarios, often called
“sensitivity analyses”, as follows:

5.2 Drug Sharing: My model directly links the number of prescriptions written to the
number of people annually initiated into opioid abuse. It is important to realize that it was
by no means a foregone conclusion that these two data sets could be modeled
concordantly with the set of assumptions I made. Therefore, the concordance found in my
model corroborates the idea that a major source of illicit drugs is diversion of legally
prescribed opioids from family and friends. The baseline model value, determined from
real world data, is four people per diverted prescription, an entirely plausible number,
since drug sharing is known to be very common (Inciardi et al 2007).

By varying this drug-sharing parameter the model can answer the questions,
“What if the number of pills diverted were different? How specifically would the death
rate change?” Because, within the model -- as prescriptions are taken from medicine
cabinets and spread into the world – some people become initiated to opioid use, some of
them become addicted, and some of them die. The parameter proliferation of pills models
the issue of how many people are infected from a single prescription. What if it changed
from its present real-world value of 4?
Figure 20 shows the effect of varying the parameter proliferation of pills.
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Figure 20: The effect of varying model parameter proliferation of pills (the number of
individuals who share from one diverted prescription; called “pills” in the figure).
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There are two noteworthy facts about Figure 18. Firstly, the size of the effect is
large – a tremendous number of lives would be saved if pill sharing were stopped.
Secondly, the death rate is not linearly proportional to the parameter proliferation of pills.
Because system dynamics models are non-linear, it would be simplistic to think that the
changes predicted by the model with regard to this or other parameters can be accurately
anticipated by simple scaling. Specifically, in this case, the predicted death rate would
have decreased by almost a factor of two in the year 2010 if proliferation had been
reduced by a factor of 4. This non-linearity follows from the fact that proliferation of pills
is not the only channel through which victims get their drugs. Sad to say, every patient
who ever receives an opioid prescription from a doctor is also another potential addict.

5.3 Long Term Pain: In my model a significant fraction of patients do not share their
pills. This is the population that includes long term pain sufferers whose tolerance grows
over time, and who therefore tend to consume all the drugs they can obtain. What if
doctors only prescribed for this population? What change in the death rate would result?
Qualitatively, it is obvious that the number of pills available to be diverted would be
smaller, and so the death rate would go down. Quantitatively, Figure 21 shows the model
results for four values of the parameter fraction of patients who use every pill.

How Death Rate Depends on Fraction of
Patients Who Do Not Share Their Pills
10
8

fraction = 0.3

6

fraction = 0.5

4

fraction = 0.7

2
0
1990

fraction = 0.9
1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

Figure 21: The effect of varying model parameter fraction of patients who use every pill
(called “fraction” in the figure).
My model therefore concludes that the death rate would be sharply decreased if
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prescription patterns were such that the patient for whom the drugs were intended
consumed all of the drugs provided. That is, drug diversion is a major cause of death.

5.4 Transition to Use of Heroin: In a recent article in The New Yorker, Agent James J.
Hunt, the head of the New York Division of the Drug Enforcement Agency, gave his
opinion about heroin in Staten Island, NY:
Agent Hunt’s office chair at his big desk in D.E.A.
headquarters in Manhattan is black and high-backed. He
wore a black shirt and a muted tie. His blue eyes and his
blond, wavy hair parted almost in the middle made his face
stand out as if in an Old Master dark-background oil
portrait. I asked if the plan to push large quantities of
cheap heroin and undersell the illegal pill market had been
the idea of a particular person—like El Chapo Guzmán
(the Sinaloan cartel leader who went to jail, escaped, and
was recently recaptured). Hunt thought a minute and said,
“Yes, it probably was his idea, or the idea of four or five
cartel leaders like him.”
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/08/antidote

When heroin is cheaper than prescription opioids, some heavy users will switch to
heroin. Because the precise relationship between rate and price is unknown (no data are
available on this issue), I can offer only an order of magnitude estimate. My model
indicates that cheaper product could create hundreds of thousands of heroin users
nationally.

Nor is price the only driver away from prescription drugs and towards heroin.
From the same New Yorker article quoted above:
Within a few months, evidence seemed to show that ISTOP
had reduced the amount of illegal opioids on the market.
Critics said the law would create a greater demand for
heroin, and that seemed to have occurred. According to
N.Y.P.D. Captain Dominick D’Orazio, commanding officer
of Staten Island Narcotics, seizures of pills had gone down
forty-four per cent, while seizures of heroin had gone up by
the same amount.
A similar trend is seen in King County, Washington (Figure 22).
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Figure 22: from http://adai.washington.edu/pubs/cewg/Drug%20Trends_2014_final.pdf

5.5 Doctor Shopping: A primary motivation for the creation of PDMPs is to abridge the
practice of doctor shopping. In my model the parameter L, the likelihood doctor will
prescribe to shopper, captures this desired change with an assigned value between 0 and
1. Figure 23 shows the number of doctor shoppers given by the model for three cases of
L: reducing the probability of a prescription from 70% to 30% in the year 2011 would
have reduced the number of doctor shoppers by a million.
How Number of Doctor Shoppers Depends
on Doctors' Willingness to Prescribe
2000000
1800000
1600000
1400000
1200000
1000000
800000
600000
400000
200000
0
1990

L = 0.3
L = 0.5
L = 0.7

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

Figure 23: The effect of varying model parameter likelihood doctor will prescribe to
shopper (called “L” in the figure).
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Since about 200 million opioid prescriptions were written in 2011, and doctor
shopping is believed to be rampant, it should be expected that the size of the reduction
would be of the order of millions. But PDMPs generally define doctor shoppers as
individuals seeking more that some specified number of prescriptions (typically five).
The PDMP algorithm makers use that kind of definition because they have no choice:
their algorithms can only control the things they can count. System dynamics
modelers are, however, not constrained by such artificial limitations.

In my model, therefore, people addicted to opioids obtained by illegal means and
subsequently seeking a legal prescription to satisfy their habit are classified as doctor
shoppers (as are people who simply heard about these drugs on the news and want to try
them; for, in the same way that warning labels have unintended consequences, news
reports outlining the dangers and potency of these drugs will have varied results).
Consequently I expect that the reduction in doctor shopping activity reported by a PDMP
will necessarily be very much smaller than predicted by my model, but the trends in the
data should be similar to the model prediction.

Data are just beginning to become available. Figure 24 is from Tennessee, while
Figure 25 shows trends from ten other states, comparing and contrasting those states that
have mandated PDMPs with those that so far have not. Clearly, prescribers do not use
PDMPs until and unless they become mandatory, as Figures 25 and 26 so vividly
illustrate.

Figure 24 http://www.slideshare.net/OPUNITE/pdmp-5-hopkins-dreyzehneroleary
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Figure 25: http://www.slideshare.net/OPUNITE/rx15-pdmpwed11151kreiner2ringwalt?next_slideshow=1

Figure 26: http://www.slideshare.net/OPUNITE/pdmp-5-hopkins-dreyzehneroleary
5.6 Future Course of the Epidemic: My model is able to predict the future course of the
epidemic by assuming the future rate of new prescriptions and any assumed changes in
the various parameters of the baseline model as a result of assumed policy changes.
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For example, I consider the extreme and unrealistic assumption that no doctor
writes an opioid prescription for a new opioid patient after 2011, and that no heavy user
switches to heroin. This counter-factual case is considered as a limiting condition -- to
show that the pool of heavy users persists for a long time under any assumption in my
model, as shown in Figure 27. Therefore my model shows that the effects of the epidemic
would linger even under the most optimistic assumptions, both because opioids are
addictive and because long-term pain sufferers have ongoing need.
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Figure 27: The most optimistic extrapolation of the epidemic

If I add the assumption that 30% of these heavy users switch to heroin, then the
number of new heroin users exceeds a million before the end of the decade. Consistent
with the assumption of tighter prescription practices, the number of long-term pain
patients experiencing under-treatment of their pain also grows rapidly. Mandatory PDMP
implementation is no more successful, but necessarily produces similar outcomes,
because its intent is to curtail the number of opioid initiates, but cannot logically do so to
a greater degree than the radical assumption I made of no new opioid patient after 2011.
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6. Discussions
6.1 The Rationale for PDMPs: I described in Section 2.1 how physicians in the
nineteenth century, faced with a lethal combination of ignorance and limited alternatives,
were seduced by the short-term symptomatic relief delivered by morphine, and often
addicted their patients to opioids. The tragic lessons of that time led to stricter
prescription laws, and taught twentieth-century physicians to be extremely cautious in
using opioids. Warnings about the dangers through popular and professional publications
were widespread and, because opioids were understood to be extremely addictive, they
became a solution of last resort.

Yet at the end of the twentieth century the use of prescription opioids suddenly
and dramatically increased. The number of opioid prescriptions written, and the rate of
deaths by opioid poisoning, grew by large factors year over year, as shown in Figure 28.

Figure 28: Increase in the rate of prescriptions and the rate of opioid deaths

The lessons of the nineteenth century had been forgotten. A change in attitude of
the nation’s doctors – a change without which there would be no opioid epidemic -- had
been driven by two very strong and very different factors. The first driver was the desire
to eliminate pain completely, and the second was aggressive marketing by drug
manufacturers (Section 4.2). The nation was awash in prescription drugs, and the
government was obliged to take remedial action through the introduction of new policies
(Section 2.2).
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Because information technology (specifically proliferation of access to the
Internet) was growing so very rapidly during the onset of the opioid epidemic it was
natural that the idea of PDMPs would arise, in the words of the New York Attorney
General,
…to increase detection of prescription fraud and drug
diversion [and] establish an on-line, real-time, controlled
substance reporting system that requires prescribers and
pharmacists to search for and report certain data at the
time a controlled substance prescription is issued, and at
the time such substance is dispensed (Section 2.3).
The next four sections, 6.2 through 6.5, discuss the four research questions
identified for detailed consideration in chapter 3. In each case the question is stated as the
header of the section.

6. 2 Are Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs an effective tool in curbing opioid
abuse? In answer to this first research question I find that the decrease in prescription
opioid abuse caused by PDMPs is often offset by a collateral increase in the use of heroin
(Section 5.3). Furthermore, the focus of PDMPs on doctor shopping does little to curb
abuse for two fundamental reasons. Firstly, a majority of opioid abusers have their first
experiences through recreational drug use (Section 5.1) using products supplied free by
friends and family, because doctors routinely write prescriptions only a fraction of which
is consumed by the patient. My model calculations show that such a prescription, not
completely consumed by the patient, will typically be distributed among four friends and
family. PDMPs are not able to track this activity, and yet the casual user may go on to
become habituated or addicted. Secondly, such a now-habituated user, presenting as a
first-time “pain” patient to a doctor, is indistinguishable from a legitimate patient in pain,
and so will not trigger the PDMP system either (Section 5.4).

6.3 How does the mandatory use of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs affect
the supply of opioids to long-term pain sufferers, many of whom already contend
that their pain is under-treated? In answer to this second research question I find that
long-term patients, who are known to develop tolerance over time, may (because of the
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regulation of opioids through PDMPs) have the experience that they are insufficiently
supplied, and therefore still in pain. I find that the mandatory use of PDMPs does limit
the access of long-term pain patients, who are caught in an unfortunate bind as their
already-large appetite for opioids grows through habituation. They therefore become the
individuals most likely to attract negative attention from PDMPs. Yet such long-term
users lobby effectively for relief. Organizations like the APS and the VHA (Section 4.2),
drive doctors towards the writing of more prescriptions. A year long comprehensive
survey of all opioid deaths in Utah (Section 4.6) is pivotal in demonstrating the outcome
of prescription to pain sufferers. This survey finds that 75% of close relatives of the 254
decedents had expressed concern about medication use even though the deceased got
their drugs as prescriptions from their doctors; that 52.9% had taken pills more often than
their prescription specified; and that 31.6% had obtained prescriptions from more than
one doctor during the previous year.

6.4 How large a factor in the opioid epidemic is sharing of drugs with family and
friends? In answer to this third research question I find that drug diversion is a major
contributor to the opioid death rate. Initial access to opioids for many people is from
family or friends. Aggressive lobbying has created a culture in which opioids are
represented as no more hazardous than over-the-counter painkillers, and so many people
accept a “gift” of opioids without reservation, and use them either for pain relief or
recreation. For a significant fraction of such casual users, whose number the
pharmaceutical industry has caused to be huge, this is the first step to addiction.

6.5 Does a System Dynamics analysis provide an adequate description for the onset
of the opioid epidemic? In answer to this fourth research question I find that a System
Dynamics model fits the parameters of the opioid epidemic. The fact that the model
provides a satisfactory fit is consistent with the possibility that these six assumptions I
made in building my model are valid: (1) A population exposed to opioids exhibits
dependency and death at an empirically determinable rate. The original reason for
exposure to opioids is not a factor. (2) When the number of pills prescribed exceeds
patient needs, exposure of family and friends leads to non-medical use. (3) Initially the
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excess of pills is greater than any demand for this diversion of supply. (4) Recreational
users supplied by family and friends give pills to their peers. (5) Initially the excess of
pills is greater than any demand for this diversion of supply. (6) As tolerance to the drug
grows in an individual dependent user, doctor shopping arises in order to meet increasing
individual need. For long-term pain sufferers who develop dependency, their supply from
a single doctor becomes insufficient to meet their needs. Patients with expectations that
this need should be fulfilled within the medical system voice complaints about undertreatment while the world nevertheless sees an ongoing epidemic. The purity and
reputable source of pharmaceutical opioids makes them preferable to heroin when they
are free and readily available. When cost and scarcity become factors, use of heroin
(which is cheaper but riskier) rises.

Variation of the various parameters within the model provides a sensitivity
analysis that highlights the huge importance of sharing of pills with family and friends as
a driver of the opioid epidemic (Section 5.1). The death rate might plausibly be halved by
a major reduction in pill sharing, but the model also shows that the effects of the
epidemic would linger even under the most optimistic assumptions, both because opioids
are addictive and because long-term pain sufferers have ongoing need (Section 5.5).

6.6 The Tradeoff Between Access and Addiction:
Opioids can relieve terrible suffering. Well-informed patients in pain, aware of
the argument of “pain as the 5th vital sign” (section 2.6), visit their doctors in full
expectation of relief. They are naturally unwilling to take no for an answer. Indeed they
are incredulous whenever they are denied their drug. But opioids are also dangerously
addictive. Therefore there is an inherent and unavoidable tension between the potential of
opioids, both to do great good through pain relief and to do great harm through the
scourge of addiction.

In the literature search (chapter 2) I discovered an unsurprising consensus that
access to healthcare generally, and to dentists and
pharmacists in particular, increases the availability of
prescription opioids in communities, which, in turn, is
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associated with higher rates of opioid abuse” (Wright et al
2014).
The GAO hearing discussed in sections 2.6 and 4.2 recognized that tradeoff in its
title: “TO DECREASE ABUSE AND MISUSE … WHILE ASSURING
AVAILABILITY FOR PATIENTS”. This difficult and perhaps irreconcilable dilemma is
implicit in the task facing pain doctors. It is therefore naturally repugnant to prosecutors
and public alike when pill mills are set up to prey upon people in pain.

The problem is further compounded by the recreational use of opioids, recorded
in history since the time of the Sumerians (section 2.1). The initial use of “the joy plant”
in a search for euphoria can end in addiction. As tolerance to the drug increases, so the
amount of drug need to achieve the same degree of effect is collaterally increased.

The best recourse to achieve a proper balance between access and addiction lies in
a clear understanding of the risks and benefits. As this thesis has shown, we live in a time
when the dangers of opioids have been broadly underestimated for more than a
generation. This has been a major contributor to the present epidemic. The introduction
of PDMPs is an attempt to regulate the balance. The counter-pressures implicit from
addiction, and from those who supply the addicts, work to thwart the regulatory effort.

6.7 Limitations of the Present Study: The modeling software I used is able to add
almost unlimited degrees of complexity. It would therefore be possible to extend the
present work to include more factors. Indeed there have been a few efforts to build
system dynamics models of the opioid epidemic that include factors beyond the scope of
my work -- most notably those by Wakeland and his collaborators -- including a paper
published 2015 November that
incorporates use trajectories including development of use
disorders, transitions from reliance on informal sharing to
paying for drugs, transition from oral administration to
tampering to facilitate non-oral routes of administration,
and transition to heroin use by some users, as well as
movement into and out of the population through quitting
and mortality.
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I made a design decision to keep my assumptions and my model as simple as
possible. The major advantage of this approach is that it captures the dynamics of the
epidemic system in a way that exposes the root issues. This is consistent with the best
traditions of the field of System Dynamics (Sterman 2000).

A second and potentially more troublesome limitation of my approach is the
possibility that the system dynamics model contains elements of self-fulfilling prophecy.
Specifically, when I choose an element to model, for example “homes with oversupply
available for extra-medical use”, that topic inevitably becomes a subject for discussion
and analysis. Perhaps this is not so bad, because the model may return a value of zero for
the contribution of a factor that turns out to be irrelevant. More concerning is the
possibility that an important factor has been omitted from the model. For in such a case,
there is no mechanism within the scope of my approach for that missing important factor
to arise from the exercise of modeling. The only checks for such potentially missing
factors lie in the completeness of my literature review and in critique of the thesis itself.

6.8 Future Work: (1) Among the factors that should be considered in future work, the
issue of drug interactions is perhaps the greatest. Benzodiazepines and alcohol are both
known to increase the risk of mortality for opioid users, and yet doctors often prescribe
benzodiazepines to their opioid patients (especially to older patients, for whom they are
specifically counter indicated), and many patients drink alcohol. The statistics from
emergency room admissions are alarming with regard to the issue of drug interactions -23.2% acute benzodiazepine intoxication and 7.6% acute alcohol intoxication in a large
sample of 92,209 admissions.
(http://archinte.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=1918924).

(2) The extremely troublesome finding (section 4.5) that young people are in most
jeopardy from diverted drugs while older people are in most jeopardy from their
prescribed drugs should be the subject of future study and intervention. The data I
presented in support of this conclusion are compelling. Anecdotal reports are fully
consistent with this finding. The mindsets and motives for opioid use in these two groups
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are widely different. Yet separate interventions tailored to the needs of the two groups
have yet to be identified.
6.9 Latest Policy From The White House: Another measure of the plausibility of the
ideas presented in this thesis is the extent to which they anticipate emergent national
policy, enacted since the completion of my model calculations. In February 2016
President Obama proposed $1.1 Billion in new funding to address prescription opioid
abuse and the heroin use epidemic. Several of the tools and interventions identified as
effective in the president’s proposal that are fully consistent with the themes of this thesis
include “evidence-based prevention programs”, “prescription drug monitoring”, and
“prescription drug take-back events”.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/02/president-obama-proposes-11billion-new-funding-address-prescription
Also reported in the president’s proposal:
The federal government is expanding access to prescription
drug monitoring program data throughout federal
agencies. The Department of Defense’s (DoD) Pharmacy
Data Transaction Service automatically screens all new
medication orders against a patient’s computerized
medication history and permits DoD physicians to monitor
for concerning drug usage patterns.
This expansion of the federal program aligns with my policy recommendation
(below; section 8.3) to use PDMPs to monitor drug interactions.
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7. Conclusions
A review of the literature has shown that the forces driving the current
prescription opioid epidemic raging across the United States include aggressive
marketing, weak regulation, addiction, freely prescribing doctors, a glut of pills available
for sharing, and easy access to illicit drugs including heroin. This thesis has quantitatively
analyzed the interactions between these drivers through construction of a System
Dynamics model, in order to determine the efficacy of policy intervention through
Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs, leading to the following conclusions:

1. PDMPs will not substantially affect the supply of opioids because they will catch only
the most egregious of doctor shoppers. Opioids are addictive, people are crafty, and pain
is a subjective experience not determinable by any test available to the prescriber.
Therefore, as long as the opioids continue to be over-supplied by doctors, their
proliferation into the community will continue to spread addiction.

2. Mandatory PDMP use will slow but not stop opioid proliferation, and will cause long
term pain patients to be under-treated in larger numbers. Doctors who presently do not
choose to use PDMPs will do so when participation is mandatory, and as a result some
types of doctor shopping will be curtailed. Collaterally, access to drugs by legitimate
long-term pain sufferers will become more difficult. Specifically, because it is not
uniformly acknowledged by the medical profession that long-term opioid users have
become addicted and habituated (and so require larger doses to obtain pain relief) those
long-term patients will be under-treated. There are very large numbers of such patients.

3. PDMPs as presently implemented are poor at addressing the problem for which they
were originally designed. They do, however, provide a good framework for dealing with
drug interactions in a complicated prescription system. Many patients have a legitimate
need for three or more prescribers, who occasionally will prescribe drugs that interact
poorly with each other. PDMPs will not stop the flow of opioids but they could be
improved by policy to stop an individual from being prescribed, for example, dangerous
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amounts of both opioids and benzodiazepines.

4. Drug diversion is a major contributor to the opioid death rate. Initial access to opioids
for many people is from family or friends. Aggressive lobbying has created a culture in
which opioids are represented as no more hazardous than over-the-counter painkillers,
and so many people accept a “gift” of opioids without reservation, and use them either for
pain relief or recreation. For a significant fraction of such casual users, whose number the
pharmaceutical industry has caused to be huge, this is the first step to addiction.

5. Opioids are addictive and should only be prescribed in cases of extreme need. Serious
acute pain and people with terminal diseases should likely be the only people prescribed
these drugs. As I was writing this thesis, I was delighted to see that the CDC came to this
very conclusion in a guideline published on 3/15/2015.
http://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/guidelines_factsheet-a.pdf

6. The rate of opioid overdose deaths will remain high. Physiological changes are caused
by ingestion of opioids, and the behavior of addicted individuals is driven, often fatally,
towards the satisfaction of their need. Opioids are dangerous, and a society plagued by a
glut of pills is at risk.

7. A significant number of people addicted to prescription opioids will transition to
heroin use for reasons of price and availability. An addicted person will find a way to
satisfy the need for drugs. If prescription opioids become less readily available, or if their
price compares unfavorably with available alternatives, addicted people will turn to
whatever satisfies their need. For many, that will be heroin, as rapidly rising statistics
across the nation demonstrate so tragically.

In summary, the opioid epidemic was created by the confluence of greed and good
intention: some people wanted to get fabulously rich, and others wanted to banish all
pain. Now the country is awash with pills and populated by unwitting addicts. This study
helps conclude that the efforts of state governments and the FDA will be insufficient to
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stem the flow of opioids, and that there is no simple intervention to thwart drug diversion
and sharing of pills. The opioid epidemic will ebb like other epidemics, as much through
self-regulation as through policy intervention. When the cultural meme that opioids
destroy lives takes hold, replacing the current idea -- that opioids are an accessible, safe
painkiller and intoxicant – then, and only then, the epidemic will subside.
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8. Policy Recommendations

I have identified the factors that drive the ongoing opioid epidemic (Section 6),
and find that there are three specific policy interventions that I would recommend highly.

1. Opioids should be used only as a solution of last resort.
Nineteenth-century physicians addicted patients—and, not
infrequently, themselves—because they had few alternatives to
symptomatic treatment. Cures were scarce and the etiology of
painful conditions was poorly understood. An injection of
morphine almost magically alleviated symptoms, pleasing
doctors and patients. Many patients continued to acquire and
inject morphine, the sale of which was poorly controlled.
The revolutions in bacteriology and public health, which
reduced diarrheal and other diseases commonly treated with
opium; the development of alternative analgesics such as
aspirin; stricter prescription laws; and admonitions about
morphine in the lay and professional literature stemmed the
addiction tide. One important lesson of the first narcotic
epidemic is that physicians were educable. Indeed, by 1919,
narcotic overprescribing was the hallmark of older, lesscompetent physicians. The younger, better-trained practitioners
who replaced them were more circumspect about administering
and prescribing opioids.
www.annualreviews.org The Opioid Addiction Epidemic page 561

Throughout most of the twentieth century physicians remained “circumspect
about administering and prescribing opioids” because they understood that opioids are
extremely addictive. Yet towards the end of the twentieth century a deliberate lobbying
effort by opioid manufacturers led important sectors of the healthcare community to act
as if opioids are safe, resulting in the epidemic described in this thesis.

Yet parts of our society, influenced by the enormous revenue that opioids
generate, continue to act as if there is no epidemic. I have described earlier how the role
of education about opioids was ceded to the drug manufacturers, and how the FDA was,
and remains, complicit in this dangerous situation. This state of affairs persists despite
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public hearings at which extensive public testimony emphasizes that “making opioid
training mandatory for doctors [is] important, and that it shouldn’t be controlled by
the drug industry”.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/fda-panel-urges-mandatory-opioid-training-for-doctors-1462405146

The headline of the quoted Wall Street Journal article, “FDA Panel Urges
Mandatory Opioid Training For Doctors,” fails to reveal that the panel, as is typical,
recommended no remedial changes, but rather opted for the status quo. Specifically, the
briefing material for the FDA panel, the Joint Meeting of the Drug Safety and Risk
Management (DSaRM) Advisory Committee and the Anesthetic and Analgesic Drug
Products Advisory Committee (AADPAC), May 3-4, 2016, included the following
paragraph:
The Extended Release/Long Acting (ER/LA) Opioid Analgesic
Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) is intended to
reduce risks and improve safe use of ER/LA opioid analgesics
while continuing to provide access to these medications for
patients in pain. The central component of the ER/LA Opioid
Analgesics REMS is an education program for prescribers (e.g.,
physicians, nurse practitioners, physician assistants). Under the
REMS, application holders of ER/LA opioid analgesics are
required to make education programs available to healthcare
providers (HCPs) who are prescribers of ER/LA opioid
analgesics. The application holders are meeting this requirement
by providing educational grants to accredited continuing
education (CE) providers who offer training to prescribers at no
or nominal cost. To be considered compliant with the ER/LA
Opioid Analgesic REMS, the CE courses are required to include
the content and messages of a “blueprint” developed by FDA for
this purpose. The FDA Blueprint includes general and productspecific information about the ER/LA opioid analgesics;
information on proper patient selection for use of these drugs;
guidance for safely initiating therapy, modifying dosing, and
discontinuing use of ER/LA opioid analgesics; guidance for
monitoring patients; and information for counseling patients and
caregivers about the safe use of these drugs. Additionally,
prescribers are provided information for how to recognize
evidence of and potential for opioid misuse, abuse, and
addiction.

http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/Dr
ugs/AnestheticAndAnalgesicDrugProductsAdvisoryCommittee/UCM497290.pdf
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Through these kinds of activities the FDA continues to promote the present
practices for the prescription of opioids -- by the use and dissemination of language like
“proper patient selection”, “guidance for safely initiating therapy”, and “counseling
patients and caregivers about the safe use of these drugs”. Although the existence of the
opioid epidemic is increasingly fully acknowledged in some branches of government
especially the White House, nowhere in this FDA “oversight” activity is it mentioned that
people are dying in epidemic numbers.
Nor is the problem limited to the behavior of the FDA. For example, The New
York Times reported:
A pain management specialist, Dr. Nathaniel Katz, was stunned
in 2012 when the Food and Drug Administration rejected a
recommendation from an expert panel that had urged mandatory
training for doctors who prescribed powerful painkillers like
OxyContin.That panel had concluded that the training might
help stem the epidemic of overdose deaths involving prescription
narcotics, or opioids. At first, Dr. Katz, who had been on the
panel, thought that drug makers had pressured the F.D.A. to kill
the proposal. Then an agency official told him that another
group had fought the recommendation: the American Medical
Association, the nation’s largest doctors organization.
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/03/business/fda-again-reviews-mandatory-training-for-painkillerprescribers.html?action=click&contentCollection=Business%20Day&module=RelatedCoverage&region=E
ndOfArticle&pgtype=article&_r=0

This entrenched behavior in the regulatory agencies and among senior doctors is
like that seen in the nineteenth century’s epidemic; and so the latter part of the quotation
that began this section is pertinent here:
One important lesson of the first narcotic epidemic is that
physicians were educable. Indeed, by 1919, narcotic
overprescribing was the hallmark of older, less-competent
physicians. The younger, better-trained practitioners who
replaced them were more circumspect about administering and
prescribing opioids.

The lessons of history therefore suggest that an effective policy intervention will
be to change the way our society views opioids. Future doctors, concerned by what they
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see happening around them now, are already beginning to demand better training to
confront the ravages of the opioid epidemic:
Calling their curriculum deficient, students at Harvard Medical
School are teaching themselves how to treat opioid addiction
— joining the ranks of critics who say medical schools across
the country aren’t doing enough to prepare doctors for a
deadly crisis.
This spring, students at Harvard have organized their own
trainings on how to use new medication to treat opioid
addiction. And they’ve launched a campaign to raise
awareness about how to buy and use naloxone, the overdosereversal drug.
https://www.statnews.com/2016/05/17/opioid-addiction-medical-schools/

In March 2016, The White House asked medical schools to sign
a pledge to require students to learn new federal guidelines for
safe opioid prescribing before they graduate. Of the nation’s
170-plus medical schools, 61 signed on. Harvard Med and
others refused. “We don’t agree with the idea of taking pledges
with what to put in our curriculum,” Dean Dr. Jeffrey Flier
said…

Another important form of education is that our elected officials become able and
willing to talk about the epidemic, and so begin to break down the stigma associated with
addiction. Governor Chris Christie did so to great effect during his presidential
candidacy, saying:
You don’t go to a neighborhood dinner party and say, “Hey, my
daughter is addicted to heroin. What’s new with you? But if she
had cancer you would tell them.
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2016/01/23/bush-christie-fiorina-kasich-2016-candidates-canchange-way-talk-about-addiction.html

The desired outcome of my policy recommendation that we use opioids only
as a remedy of last resort is that it becomes widely understood that opioids are
extremely addictive. For that to happen, it will be necessary for many people to discuss
the crisis honestly. One place for such discussion is among family and friends, which
leads to my second policy recommendation.
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2. Eliminate proliferation of pills to friends and family. The typical prescription for
minor injury provides too many pills. These fall into the hands of others, who then
also run the risk of addiction. Presently it is not easy to give back unused pills. It
should be.
My model calculations have shown that proliferation of opioids to friends and
family is a major channel for abuse and addiction, and that curtailing this proliferation
would save large numbers of lives presently lost to the opioid epidemic.

Surveys show that more that 20% of people are willing to admit that they share
opioids they obtained by prescription (Kennedy-Hendricks et al 2016). Fifty percent of
the respondents who were still taking opioids at the time of the survey said that they
expect to have drugs left over at the end of their treatment, and most of them also said
that they would keep the drugs for future use in ameliorating pain for themselves (or
others). Almost half of the survey respondents had received no counseling on storage or
disposal of the drugs.

These results confirm that doctors prescribe too many opioids, and that people are
unaware of their dangerous addictiveness. My first policy recommendation is to educate
doctors about the dangers; my second is to enact policy that limits the flow of pills from
doctors via patients to family and friends -- doctors should prescribe fewer pills, and it
should be easy for patients to dispose of any excess.
3. Use PDMPs to monitor drug interaction through the tracking of benzodiazepines
and carisoprodol in addition to opioids. Post mortem studies show that many who
die from opioids have used other drugs too. The rapid PDMP electronic monitoring
put in place for opioids should be extended to provide patient advice and protection
against drug interactions.
The number of prescription drugs used by Americans increases steeply with age.
Seniors are often prescribed five or more drugs at the same time. Under these
circumstances the possibility of unintended drug interactions rises steeply. Post mortem
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studies (described earlier) show that people dying from opioids often have other drugs in
their system.

A particularly dangerous and increasingly common three-part mixture is that of an
opioid, a benzodiazepine, and carisoprodol. (Both benzodiazepine and carisoprodol have
muscle relaxant, sedating, and anti-anxiety properties; carisoprodol also further
potentiates the effect of an opioid).
http://www.pharmacytimes.com/contributor/jeffrey-fudin/2014/09/the-perfect-stormopioid-risks-and-the-holy-trinity
Pill-mills frequently prescribe this combination. Doctor shoppers treated by a
variety of doctors may be prescribed the components separately and ingest the mixture
unwittingly. A single doctor may prescribe two or three of these drugs together in
ignorance of their potential for interaction. Drug abusers may take the mixture
deliberately.

Protection of patients from this potentially lethal drug interaction can be achieved
by policy. Since opioids, benzodiazepine, and carisoprodol are each prescription drugs, it
would be straightforward to extend the PDMP system to track them (and other
prescription drugs), and so monitor the potential for interaction in a patient. Beyond the
saving of lives, the potential cost savings in health care costs could offset the cost of the
program.

A retrospective cohort analysis (Pergolizzi et al 2014) using claims data from a
commercial enterprise showed that among 57,752 chronic, non-cancer pain patients 5.7%
(3,302 people) were exposed to a potentially major drug-drug interaction that resulted in
a $609 per month increase in health care costs for the exposed patients.

The rationale for my recommendations is simple: each of these policy
recommendations – limitation of the use of opioids to cases of last resort, reduction in the
proliferation of prescribed pills to family and friends of the patient, and PDMP
monitoring of potential drug interactions -- could save a very large number of lives.
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I was very pleased to see, as I was completing this thesis, that the White House
and the CDC issued provisions very similar to my recommendations, as follows:

In connection with this Federal announcement, more than 60 medical schools are
announcing that, beginning in fall 2016, they will require their students to take some form
of prescriber education, in line with the newly released Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain.

This CDC guideline was published March 18, 2016. It begins:
This guideline provides recommendations for primary care
clinicians who are prescribing opioids for chronic pain
outside of active cancer treatment, palliative care, and endof-life care. The guideline addresses 1) when to initiate or
continue opioids for chronic pain; 2) opioid selection,
dosage, duration, follow-up, and discontinuation; and 3)
assessing risk and addressing harms of opioid use. CDC
developed the guideline using the Grading of
Recommendations Assessment, Development, and
Evaluation (GRADE) framework, and recommendations
are made on the basis of a systematic review of the
scientific evidence while considering benefits and harms,
values and preferences, and resource allocation. CDC
obtained input from experts, stakeholders, the public, peer
reviewers, and a federally chartered advisory committee. It
is important that patients receive appropriate pain
treatment with careful consideration of the benefits and
risks of treatment options. This guideline is intended to
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improve communication between clinicians and patients
about the risks and benefits of opioid therapy for chronic
pain, improve the safety and effectiveness of pain
treatment, and reduce the risks associated with long-term
opioid therapy, including opioid use disorder, overdose,
and death. CDC has provided a checklist for prescribing
opioids for chronic pain
(http://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/38025) as well as a website
(http://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/prescribingresources.ht
ml) with additional tools to guide clinicians in
implementing the recommendations.
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